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A Philosophical Perspective on Students’ and Teachers’ Work in Art Education 
 
Guillermo Jorge Marini 
 
 
This dissertation inquires about the situation of the arts in education by suggesting an 
alternative perspective on the way we see art. It does so through the illumination of three 
distinct yet complementary ways. First, this study explores what a primordial sense of art 
would look like. I argue that we can understand art as a knowing-making disposition where 
wondering with the artwork and relating with its inherent elements becomes one and the 
same activity. Second, this investigation proposes the notion of respiration as a lens that 
allows seeing art as a fact that assumes and surpasses similar and contrary interpretations of 
the artwork’ meanings. Finally, this research proposes the notion of exercise in possibility 
as a way to further expand what art can look like in education. I claim that by developing 
resemblances of human life, art can operate as a standard of possibility. After characterizing 
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Chapter One. Introduction. 
By age nineteen I already had the growing intuition that I would dedicated my life 
to exploring the relationship between philosophy, art and education. That was the feeling 
with which I undertook my first teaching position. I was a sophomore in Philosophy, and I 
got the chance to teach two courses in a high school in the vicinity of Buenos Aires: 
philosophy and music. The philosophy side of the job had to do with teaching the first year 
of the Argentinean two-year philosophy curriculum. As it was a typical history-based 
course, the syllabus that the school provided me had only three names on it: Pre-Socratics, 
Plato, and Aristotle. Questions? Follow the standards and teaching guidelines of the Social 
Sciences Curriculum. With all the caveats that these instructions could generate in the 
students and myself, this was nothing compared to the art section of my job. 
The difficulty was that music was an elective class that the school wanted to offer to 
stress its general knowledge profile but it lacked any guideline, any. So, with a class of 
fifteen students, in a room with no instruments, and ninety minutes to meet every week, I 
thought, let’s play music. However, a couple of classes spent singing folk songs with my 
students caused some curiosity in the staff and got the more experienced teachers asking 
questions like: What are you doing? What would be the criteria to evaluate your course? 
What are students learning? My instinctive reply to all questions was “music”. But as I said 
that I realized that I was not answering what my fellow teachers were asking. 
My colleagues’ questions aimed at fundamental issues in art education: the 
epistemic point of view from where we approach the teaching and learning process; the 




in particular; the basic contents that we want to teach and make sure our students learn. 
Without doubt, all genuine educational concerns. 
When the time came for me to confront this experience with mainstream research, 
the result was nothing but a confirmation of the seriousness of those questions. For 
instance, in the latest Handbook of Research and Policy in Art Education (2004), Elliot 
Eisner and Michael Day characterize this field within the frames of Historical currents, 
Policy perspectives impacting the research of art, Learning in the visual arts, Teaching and 
teacher education, Forms of assessment in art education. Each one of these coordinates 
serves to portray the complex trends that have been ruling the development of the arts in 
education for the past thirty years or so. 
Without disputing the worth of the answers that, for example, pedagogy, assessment 
and curriculum could provide I began to feel that there was a more original inquiry to 
develop. By ‘original,’ I mean an anterior stance from where to approach art education; not 
chronologically before but somehow through and beyond what we have come to call “art 
education.” In the most basic terms that I could think of my question was:  
What is the art we talk about when we talk about the arts in education? 
Truly enough, we do talk about many things relating to art education. For example, 
we do worry and invest a lot of resources in tracing the possible connections between the 
arts and academic performance (Winner & Cooper, 2000). Imagine the potential behind 
verifiable instruments that could tell us what is the art form that has the strongest impact on 
our children’ SAT! Equally, we have the sense that the arts have a tight connection with 
widely appreciated labor competencies such as creativity and innovation (Doddington, 




economy and general welfare. And obviously, we seem to believe that the arts have the 
capacity to render some of the upmost instances of existential splendor (Koopman, 2005). 
No one would deliberatively choose to get rid of the sources of such vital joys. 
The truth is that these arguments –that in my reading emerge as three of the key 
perspectives from where to affirm the place of the arts in education– emphasize distinct 
qualities of the arts that live in the crossroads in which students and teachers work every 
day. This is to say, that in the actual practice of education we attend to a more complex 
order, an order build up by the interactions of teachers and students, relationships that are 
far richer that what any argument can explain. Because both teachers and students have to 
make their day and pass their exams; they make an effort for their present and future jobs; 
they need their joys as much as they need to assume their pains; they try to express 
themselves and inquiry on their own activity as something peculiarly humane. It is with 
these considerations in mind that I want to embrace my original question once again: What 
is the art that we talk about when we talk about the arts in education? 
 
A three-way road map 
This project will propose three distinct yet complementary ways to illuminate art 
through the work that students and teachers undertake daily, as if they were lenses that 
could help us see qualities that seem difficult to perceive in the current situation of art 
education. 
In Chapter Two, we will develop A primordial sense of art to help us begin 
approaching this inquiry. In the first place, I will try to introduce the conundrum that I find 
in the question about what is art education. In brief terms, the way we understand art 




education, typically, what we could call the educational benefits of the arts. This is to say; 
when we look at art education we look according to those qualities that have been identified 
and made visible as positive outcomes. 
But what about the possibility of other educational qualities that could be invisible 
when faced by the lights and vision instruments we have been using so far? If they exist we 
must seek for them in the ‘dark.’ But how do you seek for something in the dark where 
there is no light to illuminate it? Far from trying to propose a paradox, I am explicitly 
claiming that the perspectives we assume to approach art necessarily condition the art we 
are able to see. Thus, from the very outset of this project, I will be trying to gain awareness 
of the way we frame the arts for these frames –any frames indeed– serve the double 
objective of telling what we should expect to learn and what we should expect not to learn. 
In this line of thought, I will argue that art supposes an original disposition, 
“primordial” in the language of Martin Heidegger (Malpas, 2006), that allows to rise 
beyond the heuristic distinction of ‘known skill’ and ‘made product.’ From a primordial 
viewpoint, I will consider art as a disposition in the sense that it sets in order the processes 
of knowing and making, and it helps sustain their collaboration. Here, knowing will expand 
its meaning into wondering within and about the artwork, and making will develop into 
unifying all of the artwork’s inherent elements. 
In Chapter Three, we will work on Art as Respiration. We will first revisit the 
assumptions behind what is commonly understood to be educational in the arts by 
examining two intriguing arguments in favor of their intrinsic value. I will first consider 




other” (2002). I consider these authors as straightforward defenders of the arts as 
educational per se rather than as an addition to or a detour from education. 
However, the way they present their arguments seems problematic for they react 
against mainstream art education. This presents no complication from an argumentative 
point of view, for they artfully pick their adversaries to better portray “art as fulfillment” 
and “art-that-is-other”. What I find challenging is that in doing so, their actual contributions 
become barely relatable, if not completely isolated from each other in real educational 
practice. 
This is why I will propose Igor Stravinsky’s “respiration” (1975) as a surpassing 
alternative that engulfs the previous ones in the sense that through “respiration” we can 
approach Koopman’s and Ruitenberg’s notions as interpretative terms, co-existent even 
when we may favor either one in approaching art. As an example of this engulfing, I will 
offer Maurice Ravel’s Bolero as an art work that helps distill three pedagogical implications 
contained in this approach to art: the consideration of art’s time in education; of its room; 
and of its overall sense of experiment. 
In Chapter Four I will inquiry about art as an exercise in possibility. Here, I will 
explore the notions of poiesis, mimesis and possibility as conditions to learn with art from 
the viewpoint of Aristotle’s Poetics. 
In considering poiesis, I will argue that the type of relationship between artist and 
work supposes both a mutually creative task and a relational process between all of the 
works’ basic elements (Heidegger, 1996). Through mimesis, I will argue that the type of 
learning that may be developed with art is not just a product of human interaction with the 




their works (Benjamin, 1996), and identifying those resemblances as such. The way of 
possibility will allow me to emphasize how the artwork may operate both as a 
crystallization of possibilities and as a standard for the future discovery of new 
resemblances. 
In Chapter Five, Illuminating the work of students’ and teachers’ in art education, 
we will use these three ways to try to make sense of two lived art in education experiences. 
We will provide special attention to the way both examples help recuperate the conclusions 
at which we arrived in each Chapter, and present them under the light of students’ and 
teachers’ everyday work. 
 
What these three ways are 
By now the reader could be asking herself: What are these “primordial”, 
“respiration” and “possibility” notions? Where did they come from? What is their use? It is 
clear to me that they are interpretative ways like the ones we will discuss in Chapter Three. 
I would be happy to call them heuristics if the reader keeps in mind that the Greek eurisko 
literally means “the action of discovering” (Liddell, 1996). These three ways are nothing 
but that, actions of dis-covering art in education. They are not the final product of this 
discovery nor some form of rubric to assess the nature of this action. They are three 
possible ways of coming to know this very process. In other words, they are paths to help 
us “see watching”1 the ways according which we could see the arts in education under a 
new light. 
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 Certainly, Edgar Morin (2004) has taken this notion into an adjacent arena by defining 




With this in mind, I do not expect the reader to learn by heart the set of arguments 
and examples that build up each of these ways. Instead, I hope to be able to provide the 
necessary context for the reader to immerse herself within these ways and appropriate the 
peculiar crossroads that I find in between philosophy, art and education. Put differently, 
more than guiding the reader through a series of qualities that could build some form of 
conceptual definition; I prefer to call into question some of the prevalent conditions that 
seem to obviously frame the relationship between philosophy, art and education today. 
Along these lines, it will be helpful to highlight that I present each of these three 
ways following a similar strategy: I will begin each Chapter building on arguments and 
examples that help us identify and distinguish some of the salient qualities present in each 
way –Knowing and making within a primordial sense of art, similar and contrast within 
respiration, poiesis and mimesis within possibility–. I will conclude each chapter trying to 
present other arguments and examples to bring together those same qualities without 
mixing them up. Building on Tyson Lewis’ (2011) notion of rhythm, I want to say that this 
movement to distinguish and to bring back together will be both a cycle within cycles as 
well as an actual growth. This is to say that the grounds from where we will begin telling 
the different qualities that build up each of these three ways will not be the same grounds 
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 This is why I argue that these ways are distinct yet complementary, for they imply each 
other, and what one emphasizes is another way of presenting what the other developed in 
turn. Put differently, the reader should expect a recursive thesis more than a progressive one 
which is to say that my last argument about possibility will not only serve as a conclusion 




A note on my examples 
 
I will use seven ‘art works’ examples: Emperor by Beethoven; Paintings from 
Lascaux Cave; Guernica by Pablo Picasso; Bolero by Maurice Ravel; The Gates by Christo 
and Jeanne-Claude; Gertrude Stein by Pablo Picasso; One byJackson Pollock. 
I anticipate that the reader can be struck by the fact that I am only offering Western 
art, most of which has already entered into the Elysium of the ‘classics.’ Also, these are 
popular artworks in the sense that thousands of people have free access to these works 
during certain days of the week in major museums, or theaters, or through the internet. 
With out doubts, the selection of these works is a demonstration of my Western education, 
personal tastes, and idiosyncratic point of views about what constitutes artful examples, and 
publicly accessible works. 
My honest expectation in providing these works as examples is that they will help 
me clarify and advance my argument. I do believe that they may exemplarily show the 
qualities that I find in them, and that they will serve as appropriate capstones from where to 





Chapter 2. A primordial sense of art 
Let us imagine that a man loses his keys one night and starts looking for them under 
the light of a street lamp. When people join him and try to help him search, they ask where 
it was that he thinks he might have let them fall; with a frustrated look on his face, he then 
points into the dark distance and says, by way of explanation, “I am looking under the 
lamppost because this is where the light is!” This story, introduced by Janice Ross (2007), 
Professor of Dance at Stanford University, provides us with a metaphorical description of 
the current situation in arts education advocacy. Certainly we can only look for the arts in 
education where there is something about them that can be seen. And yet, there may be 
aspects of them concealed beyond the reach of the vision instruments we have been using 
thus far. 
This chapter will affirm the possibility of approaching art in a way that assists in 
revealing these “invisible” qualities. We will begin by portraying the type of lights that 
mainstream art education is framed by. Second, we will show how the reduction of the arts 
into transferable skills can be both illuminated and surpassed by an inquiry into the practice 
of art. Then we will characterize some of the distinct attributes of practicing science and 
making art as a means to further distill what a primordial sense of art may be actually 
modeled after. Finally, I will propose to recuperate a primordial sense of art, a perspective 
framed by a making-knowing disposition. 
What can we begin to suggest about a way of seeing something that, as described in 
the example above, remains in the shadows? No doubt, this is an “obscure” way of seeing. 




what it is, to “show its colors,” and thus we judge it as nonsense, arcane, or uncertain—as 
expressed in the Latin etymology of obscurus (Lewis, 2002). On the other hand, while 
resisting the usual forms of comprehension, it may still invite us to linger with it, this 
implicit invitation being the first sign that its obscurity may correspond to an intensity of 
meaning that we are not used to perceiving. This is the sense in which Aristotle (1957) says 
in Metaphysics: 






The meaning of this image lies in the fact that there is more to be seen than what 
meets the eye, or, in other words, in our usual ways of seeing. This is not to say that our 
cognitive powers are defective in any way but rather to acknowledge that there are aspects 
of reality that will not simply adapt to us and thus will challenge us to leave the eyes of our 
mind ajar. It is precisely due to those “objects” that are invisible that the owl will develop 
an enhanced vision as the night falls. Put differently, not being able to look at the Sun 
directly is an opportunity to learn how to see in the shadows. 
In this line, one of the most obscure aspects we are forced to deal with in the arts is 
the fact that “we appeal to [them] to say, paradoxically, what words can never say” (Eisner, 
2002). Consider how we all seem to share a plethora of experiences in which we turn to the 
arts for an expression of what impacts us most deeply: The bonding of two lovers, the 
entrance into the different stages of life, the eulogy given over a casket, even the 
celebration of everyday joys. Think of those artworks we most cherish and keep throughout 
our lives as an expression of who we are: that portrait, an amulet, this tune. In and of 
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themselves, these artworks have meanings that evade explicit explanations and yet they 
seem to offer an alternative view of the spectrum of human life that would remain 
otherwise hidden. Consider how our life would look without them! 
However, almost every debate about the role of the arts in education seems to be 
framed by the preeminent variables of policy, budget, and accountability. It is in this 
environment that we listen to questions such as: What is the purpose of the arts in 
education? What do they teach? What problems do they solve? How can they be assessed? 
How much will they cost? While there appears to be an implicit consensus that the arts 
have an educational role or that they at least embody aspects of a liberal arts education, 
what is pervasive throughout the contemporary debate seems to be the question of what a 
credible justification would look like. Perhaps in pursuing the quest for intrinsic 
justifications, we may be better able to understand how the obscurity surrounding the arts 
may actually shed some light on education today. 
Before continuing, it is worth clarifying what I mean by an “intrinsic justification.” 
If a justification aims at “showing [something or someone] to be right or reasonable” 
(Agnes, 2002), I understand an intrinsic justification to do so by exhibiting the value of 
core qualities rather than outcomes that can be verified against external criteria. In other 
words, an intrinsic justification would reflect the qualities that live in the practice and 
inquiry of art rather than expose only the evaluation of how the arts impact other areas of 






The shrinking of the arts into transferable skills 
As vastly documented across different literature reviews (Eisner, 2009; Koopman, 
2005; Winner & Cooper, 2000), the majority of fieldwork research and philosophical 
inquiry devoted to justifying the presence of the arts in education have done so in terms of 
the arts’ instrumental contributions to non-artist results: Fundamentally, the arts’ 
hypothetical potential to trigger cognition within the school setting and their supposed 
ability to incite a democratic sensibility in society at large. From a cognitive point of view, 
this means that visual arts could have the potential to improve reading proficiency, music to 
enhance the understanding of mathematics, drama to increase verbal skills, and all the arts 
to augment emotional intelligence. Likewise, the arts are considered agents of democratic 
socialization, for they seem to teach students how to creatively address society’s 




However, as Stuart Richmond (1998), Art Education Professor at Simon Fraser 
University, indicates, although these perspectives do not lack internal logic once accepted, 
it is important to realize that they ultimately depend on the emphasis being on transferable 
artistic skills which supposedly benefit other school subjects rather than the practice and 
inquiry of art per se. These instrumentalist views do promise to teach some skill through 
the use of the arts, and they succeed even at the cost of distorting art in the process. An 
archetypical example will help clarify the point: 
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As a combination of both sets of benefits, there has lately been a renewed effort to frame 
“creativity” and “innovation” as qualities that emerge from the arts and may expand into 




During the 2011 edition of the Philosophy of Education Society Conference, Yueh-
Mei Li from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, presented a paper titled 
“School Funding and Arts Education.” Presenting her position as a straightforward 
advocate for the arts, she proceeded to defend both the budget for and the actual presence of 
the arts in the school curricula. Her core argument was as follows, “It has been 
demonstrated that children that learn music score higher in their mathematics SATs” (Li, 
2011). Thus, she provided conclusive evidence that the arts had a positive impact on 
students’ mathematical performances, which she put forth as the strongest reason to defend 
the general inclusion of the arts into the classroom. 
It seems to me that this line of thought actually works against the otherwise 
legitimate attempt to defend the educational value of the arts. The reason is twofold: First 
of all, the logic behind these arguments seems to be fallacious. I use “fallacious” here not in 
the sense that I believe Ms. Li is lying, but rather that she is arranging her argument in a 
way that very much follows the pattern of an “after this therefore because of this”5 fallacy 
that would suggest something like: 
Fact A: 
 
“A group of students scored high in 




“The same students took a music 




“A group of students scored high in 
their math SATs because they took a 
music course.” 
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As observed, the fallacy lies on the before-because relationship. The fact 
that a group of students that scored high on their exam had previously taken a music 
course is no sufficient reason to demonstrate that the music course improved in any 
way the exam result. Although this formal observation may appear to be 
commonplace, there is a long list of educational researches that, while cautiously 
co-relating the arts with cognitive and social outcomes, virtually frames these 
domains as causally related.
6
 
The propensity to look for causal relationships is significant here, for I 
believe it predetermines the type of artistic outcomes we are willing to legitimize as 
educational. As Winner and Cooper (2000) declare in one of the most extensive 
investigations on this issue: there is “no evidence (yet) for a casual link between art 
study and academic achievement.” Ultimately, it looks as if the main argument for 
the arts in education is to seek for a proof that they contain some sorts of 
capabilities that can be put to use for a more traditional and practical subject.
7
 This 
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 For example, in a report sponsored by the United States President’s Committee on the 
Arts and the Humanities, James Catterall (1999), Professor of Education at the University 
of California, Los Angeles, concludes that “students who report consistent high levels of 
involvement in instrumental music over the middle and high school years show significantly 
higher levels of mathematics proficiency by grade 12” (p.2). In the same report, Dennie 
Palmer Wolf, Professor of Education at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, 
highlights that “in the context of continuing a well-implemented opera work, groups of 
students become increasingly expert at active participation in the form of taking turns and 
asking questions. Student remarks link back to earlier turns, they can make constructive 
comments, and they can edit their own earlier suggestions in the light of an evolving 
discussion” (p. 94). My emphases. 
 
7
 Along these lines, Elliot Eisner (2004), Emeritus Professor of Art and Education at the 
Stanford University School of Education, has already provided a set of longitudinal studies 
that track non-art teachers’ contradictory use of art in the classroom. The research 




is the preliminary caveat that we need to bear in mind when reading that the above 
relation between music and mathematics “has been demonstrated.” 
 
Expanding the arts to be more than skills training 
Let us next focus on what “learning music” might be taken to mean in Li’s 
argument. There is no real discussion about the fact that Western musical notation has 
historically relied on fractions, for example, as a means of expressing some of the inherent 
relationships between rhythm and melody. This is why we talk about the whole note (1) as 
the reference value in any given measure, and it is precisely in relation to that whole note 
that we play halves (1/2), quarters (1/4), eighths (1/8), sixteenths (1/16), thirty-seconds 
(1/32), and sixty-fourths (1/64). Likewise, the relationship between pitches has been noted 
in fractions since the pre-Socratics started researching the basic sounds that can be 
produced out of a single string by changing its length. Tradition has it that when Pythagoras 
first divided a string in one-half, he wrote down this sound as one octave higher, or 2/1, 
compared to the sound produced by the whole string (Kirk, 2003). One could fairly well 
conclude, then, that mathematical fractions constitute one of the tools every musician in the 
Western world acquires, implicitly or explicitly, while learning music. 
The question still remains, however, as to whether there is anything else in learning 
music beyond gaining the ability to deal with fraction-like relationships. Let us consider the 
musical dynamic terms for a moment. Words like adagio, diminuendo, forte constitute 
more than an indication of the speed and intensity of sound or the stylistic way to carry the 
                                                                                                                                                     
expected from their choosing to invest their students’ time with the arts. The guiding 




music throughout the performance. In learning to play music, these terms invite both 
teachers and students to make a decision about how to play a given phrase. In other words, 
the actual rendition of their musical act becomes an interpretative exercise of the dynamic 
terms indicated in the musical score. 
Let us imagine a music class where teacher and students are rehearsing the second 
part of Beethoven’s Fifth Piano Concerto, the adagio movement. I am going to assume that 
the conductor, musicians and occasional spectators know the music by heart; it is a widely 
recognized “classic.” It is very likely that all involved have heard a number of 
performances of the same movement, so they have a large set of common elements with 
which to compare and complement their rehearsal. They even know that adagio means “at 
ease” in Italian, and as a technical musical term, it means that the piece should have 
roughly sixty to seventy rhythmical beats per minute, just like the human heart at rest. 
Now we arrive at the moment of actually playing music during the rehearsal. The 
musicians tune their instruments, the conductor stares at them, he breathes, the room fills 
with silent anticipation, and then the baton comes down, firing the first beat. Gently, each 
instrument blends in, preparing the stage for the piano just as a farmer plows the soil, 
preparing the seedbed. 
However, as the piano enters the scene, there is a disruption, uneasiness—
something does not seem to work. So the conductor stops the rehearsal and opens a brief 
dialogue with the pianist. They both know well enough what adagio means: there is no 
need for the metronome to count beats or the dictionary to explain words. What is at stake 




In our example, conductor, pianist, and orchestra members inquire about the 
“intention of the phrase,” “the appropriate emphasis with which to approach it,” “its 
texture.”  Then, they direct their attention to the written music and the orchestral measure 
that anticipates the piano, and wonder about the “space” that the chords are granting the 
piano: “How will we play this?” After a short exchange, the pianist promptly rehearses a 
couple of starts on the keyboard, nods to the conductor, and waits for him to summon the 
whole group once again. This time, the piano gracefully joins in and Beethoven’s adagio 
continues to be rehearsed once again. 
What happens, then, is a demonstration of what Suzanne Langer (1942) calls 
“studio metaphors.” Artists in general, musicians in this case, are conscious of knowing 
certain qualities of their art that they are nonetheless unable to put down in words. 
Obviously, they know the necessary technical expressions that rule their art; they have 
grown and become artists with them, but, still, they daily find themselves in situations 
where that knowledge is not sufficient to sustain their art’s expressiveness. Thus, for a lack 
of adequate terms, they tend to create metaphors that account for this tacit knowledge, an 
exercise that enriches their overall practice and helps it to evolve.
8
 
The conductor, pianist, and orchestra musicians can now account for an educational 
opportunity that was virtually present in the score but needed an exercised inquiry of its 
music to become alive. One could argue that the participants have acquired a wider sense of 
appreciation for the multiple musical features that are intertwined in this piece; they have 
demonstrated the ability to speak to and about tacitly known aspects of their art; they have 
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 Certainly, Michael Polanyi (2009) has taken this idea of tacit knowing into a new level by 




dealt with the challenge of offering an alternative meaningful interpretation of an already-
known piece; ultimately, they made music while also playing Beethoven. 
Not to over romanticize art, it is worth noting with Nicholas Burbules (2008), 
Professor of Education at the University of Illinois, that “simply because the knowledge at 
stake may be inexpressible [in the sense of not being explicit all the time], the strategies for 
fostering it are not random or happenstance” (p. 673). The example above is perhaps an 
everyday situation in rehearsal practice, but it does not come into existence out of the void. 
Consider how the musicians know at least the fundamental elements of their art that enable 
them to hold their instruments and read the score. Without this pre-existent knowledge, 
they would not be able to move into what remains to be played in Beethoven. Put 
differently, some of the crucial features in playing music depend on a previous and ongoing 
commitment to art as a condition to be able to make music beyond the written rhythms and 
pitches. 
Going back to Li’s example (2011), I want to further argue that, although we use 
fractions to express some aspects of the language of Western music, this does not reduce 
the reality of music to its mathematical qualities only. An idea we will further develop in 
the discussion of tekne in Chapter Four, in music, as in every art, tools are necessary for the 
building of the work but they do not constitute the work of art per se. The tool is always 
organic to the development of the craft, and it naturally serves it by aiding in the material 
concretion of the work. In this sense, a tool is always instrumental, as fractions are to 
music, because it may be isolated from the whole of the work and serve some other 




artwork meaningless. In other words, one could argue that the tool is necessary in the 
making of the work but not sufficient to make sense of it. 
I would also argue that an overemphasis on the instrumental, transferable skills of 
the arts tends to reduce them into mere servants of other school subjects instead of opening 
up an inquiry on the qualities they themselves specifically have to offer to education. If the 
strongest possible justification for the arts in education lies in their being some type of 
matrix for abilities that actually belong to another subject but are more easily acquired 
through art, how do we know if other activities, like stargazing or ping-pong, will not prove 
more effective teachers in the future and thus downgrade the arts even further? As 
Constantijn Koopman (2005), Professor at the Dutch Royal Conservatoire, states: 
As long as we rely only on instrumental values […] our justification remains 
vulnerable; for it can always be questioned whether the benefits are really 
significant and durable, and whether the arts are the most efficient way of 





By now we have already examined how both looking for causality between the arts 
and academic performance, and searching for transferrable skill seems to render an 
instrumental version of the arts where there will be little or no room to appreciate the value 
of music’s dynamic terms interpretation, for example. As a matter of fact, if we search for 
strong relationships between the arts and achievement we may eventually find some co-
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 I am reminded here of a quotation from Wittgenstein’s Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (2007). It goes in the line of the following 
thought experiment: If we could achieve the same results that art does by way of an 
injection, would we prefer the injection to art? This argument complements Koopman’s, for 
if the emphasis is placed on what the arts generate as effects, then their value remains 
conditioned to the evaluation of outcomes and nothing can assure us that they will not be 
replaced by something else in the near future. Although outside of the scope of our present 
investigation, it seems Wittgenstein could have wondered about these same issues when he 




relations in the same way that if we seek to identify the most productive musical skills to 
transfer into the school curriculum we may agree on some. Regardless of what or if we find 
something—we may be actually self-fulfilling our own prophecy—in following this path 
we seem to be teaching the mathematics in music rather than the music in playing 
Beethoven. 
 
Seeing the arts on the model of the sciences 
Moving on, I see a deeper tension that runs through the relationship between art and 
education based on the contemporary understanding of what constitutes mainstream 
education in general. Following Catherine Elgin (2002), Professor of Philosophy of 
Education at Harvard University, we need to realize that the arts in education are framed 
today by a monolithic way of understanding education that subsumes most forms of 
knowledge under the model of the scientific disciplines. Thus, it seems that art education 
has to either adapt to the current scientific standards of how education should look or 
surrender the claim of being educational at all. 
Not to fall into exaggerating, I want to emphasize that the sciences and arts are 
related and share common elements; after all they are both human inventions. And this 
relationship certainly seems to be a fact from the point of view of a human being from 
whom both scientific and artistic makings emerge as a continuation of her vital activity. 
However, when it comes to considering the education of this same person, the main artistic 
qualities allowed into the threshold of the “educational” seem to be those that can 
demonstrate progress, be quantified, systematized, analyzed and explained: the scientific in 




looking more like their academic peers” […] “emulating criteria and standards that 
populate academic subjects” (p.6). 
In this section, I wish to resist the caricature of the differences between arts and 
sciences: the arts are creative, whereas the sciences are composed of dispassionate 
formulas, etc. Instead, I will try to furnish a characterization of the distinct attributes 
involved in doing science and producing art as a means to expose the types of challenges 
and contributions that I believe art has to offer to education. For the sake of clarity, I will 
focus on Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation and Picasso’s Guernica as archetypes of 
how making science and art look like. 
Let us first compare the movement of Newton’s and Picasso’s activities. Science 
advances step-by-step, like a man going up a ladder whose journey physically depends on 
each of the previous steps that his field and he have taken in the past. Once he has moved 
on, there is no real need for revisiting what has happened already, since each new step 
leaves the previous ones behind either by correcting or expanding them into an ever-richer 
complexity. In this sense, science literally pro-gresses (Lewis, 2002), it “moves forth,” it 
“improves” as it gets further away from its primitive origins into the unveiling of what is 
still unknown. 
Without doubt, Sir Isaac Newton acknowledged his past tradition, but he was set on 
future discoveries—what was yet to be found. He knew well enough that Kepler’s 
description of the orbits of the planets made sense but did not fully explain why they 
actually moved in ellipses. It was only after continuous investigations that he was able to 




theory. And it was thanks to Newton’s own inconsistencies that Einstein would later 
advance gravitational physics. And it was thanks to Einstein’s gaps that… In general, it is 
the solution to challenges that truly moves science on. 
Art seems to move in a different manner. More than following a centrifugal vector, 
art seems to revisit its themes, materials, and techniques in a way that resembles the flux 
and reflux of a tide. It is perhaps in this sense that Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2004) suggests 
that no matter the evolution of artistic instruments, visiting the prehistoric paintings of 
Lascaux (see below) still astounds us. As if within those underground chambers, these 
strangely familiar fingerprints and animal hunting scenes somehow contain the whole of art 






After visiting Lascaux for the first time, Pablo Picasso is reported to have said 
“They have invented everything” (Thurman, 2008). In the voice of one of the most 
progressive artists of his time, this statement on one of the most ancient of arts calls forth 
the fact that art does not have to progress incrementally in order to advance; it does not 
require the newness of a breakthrough to be seen as original. For example, Picasso’s 
Guernica (see above) surely consists of bulls and horses and men like those on the 
prehistoric walls, but Picasso does not seem to be correcting or expanding those paintings; 
it rather looks as if he was renewing a common theme from his own viewpoint. 
Going back to the movement of science through the years, it seems to me that we 
not only get a sense of its inevitable evolution by comparing yesterday’s technical 
accomplishments (like the capacity to measure the fall of an apple from a tree) with today’s 
satellites orbiting around the Earth, but specifically in weighing the amount of data we 
presently have at our fingertips. These discrete pieces of information that reflect 
quantifiable phenomena constitute the most solid ground from which to take new steps into 
the further advancement of scientific knowledge (Elgin, 2002). What is more, this 
information is as accurate as can be produced by man, for it purposely leaves aside all 
nuanced particularities, favoring a standardization of individual qualities that is easy to 
subsume under general rules. 
Consider Newton’s achievement in arriving at the definitive formula of the 
acceleration at which an object falls, the famous 9,8 meter / second
2
, which signifies that 
every second the object increases its fall speed by 9,8 meters. What he did in order to get to 
this number was to record the acceleration of different objects falling from a tower. Some 
fell closer to 10m/s
2
, some closer to 9m/s
2




and air resistance. After a long succession of experiments, he was able to dissolve those 
subtle differences into a general formula. In other words, each of his tests gained meaning 
inasmuch as they approached the conclusive general rule. 
Likewise, the tide-like movement characteristic of the arts is not only perceived by 
comparing Lascaux’s prehistoric figures with Guernica but in alternating between taking a 
close-up and distant perspective of the work as a whole as well as of its elements. This 
movement allows for the possibility of realizing how the different elements of the work are 
actually composed, in such a way that every single detail makes a difference to the whole 
work. And it is precisely such unity that demands that no detail standardized omitted or 
blended but alternatively recognized and appreciated from the different perspectives from 
which the work is approached. 
Consider Picasso’s different studies on the figure of the horse for Guernica (see 
below)—what we may call sketches or trials. As we will continue to see while examining 
Maurice Ravel’s Bolero in Chapter Three, this exercise of reformulating the same theme or 
figure has unique implications for the work of art as a whole. Consider how Picasso finally 
introduces the horse in its proper place within the larger canvas; its former qualities as a 
series of attempts are not discarded or neglected but rather united into the entire work in 
such a way that if they were missing Guernica would become a different work. In fact, it is 
superficial to speak about the horse as “an element” of Guernica. Who would dare to ask 





Now let us consider the salient actions in producing scientific data: analyses and 
explanation. Science analyses in the very etymological sense of the Greek analyen (Liddell, 
1996), it “breaks up,” it unloosens the different elements of life, scanning for those 
graspable qualities that help the scientist make sense of the subject matter under study. 
Similarly, science explains: literally, from the Latin ex-plano (Lewis, 2002), which means 
“to flatten,” for it aims at making all peculiarities plain by carefully selecting the most 
accurate and univocal language available (i.e., typically a mathematical translation of the 
data above). 
This is perhaps the reason why Newton is regarded as one of the most important 
physicists of all time. He was able to analyze the way in which the mass of two objects 
affects both, how bodies fall toward each other, and why things move in the customary 
manner in which we daily experience them. What is more, he made sense of these 
phenomena and expressed his understanding in the most accurate and univocal terms 
possible: = 9,8m/s
2
. This is a powerful formula, for it allows even the physics neophyte to 
begin to understand a complex phenomenon like gravity in such a way that he no longer 




Art’s inherent demand for a recognition and appreciation of its integrity calls for a 
different approach from that of analysis and scientific explanation; art needs instead 
metaphor and description. Art actively embodies metaphor because it allows us to consider 
both the meanings that move toward a resemblance of reality and those other meanings that 
move farther away from it, creating an opening to unveil new and intermediate meanings. 
Likewise, art supposes description, for it literally “de-scribes” and “un-writes” the labels 
we use to name things and presents us with a conceptually naked perspective on the 
makings or creations of mankind. 
When asked about the meaning of Guernica, Picasso allegedly answered in the line 
of: 
This bull is a bull and this horse is a horse... If you give a meaning to certain 
things in my paintings it may be very true, but it is not my idea to give this 
meaning […] I make the painting for the painting. 
 
 
Certainly, this did not mean a rejection of the historic circumstances under the 
influence of which the work was commissioned. Guernica was the explicit response to the 
government’s request to say “something” about the 1937 German bombing of Spain. And 
yet, Guernica as a painting of men, bulls, and horses seems to call for a pondered 
rumination of the work even beyond a contextualized translation. The meaning of the 
meaning of the work seems to refer us inevitably back to the work itself. We will return to 
this point in Chapter Three, when discussing the notion of “art-that-is-other” (Ruitenberg, 
2002). 
We also know art and science depend on different ways of experimentation. The 




precise and concrete as possible, clearly defining the boundary between what the scientist 
knows and what he hypothesizes. It is an experiment brought forth by the identification of 
an original problem, whose solution is conjectured and tested, and remains a problem until 
it is finally solved. In this setting, ambiguities are antiscientific, for they interfere with the 
clear visualization of the problem, its thorough experimentation, and systematic 
generalization. 
The work of art is an experiment of another kind, for it opens up such a degree of 
possibility that its necessary material constraints are oftentimes supplemented or completed 
by whoever is observing the work. It is perhaps in this sense that Igor Stravinsky (1975) 
talks about the viewer’s capacity to resolve the chord that remains dissonant or complete 
the line that has not been drawn. In engaging with art, it seems we tend to perceive the 
unclear and assume or complete its meaning in an effort to make sense of the whole work. 
This creative act provides a feeling of fresh possibilities without quite defining the work. In 
this sense, ambiguities are an inherent element of art, for they seem to encompass and even 
amplify the layers of possible meanings in the work. 
Finally, we could argue that, although science and art are human creations, the way 
in which they relate man and work are rather different. The scientific method poses 
characteristic demands on the scientist, for it is a disciplinary given that the technical 
conditions of his experiments and the ultimate expression of his findings must be detached 
from his individual circumstances. This does not mean that the scientist should not feel his 
quest as a personal obsession; on the contrary, without this passion he would never commit 
to pursuing his scientific experiments. What is decisive here is that those passions should 




paraphrase David Hansen, Professor of Philosophy and Education at Teachers College, the 
scientist puts the world in question, but not himself. 
In reading Newton’s notes on gravitation, it is easy to find how his disciplinary 
scheme ends up reinforcing the distinction between subject and object and seeing them as 
real and independent entities. What Newton was looking for was a definitive solution to the 
problem of gravitation. The only good scientific answer had to be a proposition of timeless 
truth, a universal law independent of all human circumstances. His efforts were directed 
toward the discovery of a principle that rules the Universe from the very origins of all 
beings and yet rests completely detached from them. And he did succeed: gravitation is a 
fact explained by Newton’s law. 
Art challenges the artist completely. Its processes and products cannot but be 
embedded, soaked in his person. Far from reducing the idea of art to a whimsical 
outpouring of self-expression, art should instead be seen as encompassing the qualities of 
its maker like a seal of which only the edges are visible. It is perhaps in this sense that Jorge 
Luis Borges used to say that “every poem is autobiographical,” as opposed to 
autobiography, because the artist seems to be the first reference in a work of his own 
making that both includes and questions him and still resonates beyond his reach and 
comprehension. 
Guernica is Picasso’s work. But can it be an independent object in the style of 
Newton’s law? We have to acknowledge that it includes the combination of pre-existing 
materials into a piece of craftsmanship, and under certain conditions it may be called “a 




rules, in engaging with Guernica, I need to add an active collaboration on my side. This is 
to say that my relationship with the work of art is not one of reproduction or utilization but 
of personal participation. There are aspects of my bond with Guernica that I cannot 
translate into universal objective concepts that people would understand univocally. The 
artwork may be done as “a thing,” but its meaning, its intimate taste, cannot be alluded to 
without giving way to interpretative metaphors. 
 
The unfolding of a primordial sense of art 
Far from trying to portray the sciences as cold laboratory work and the arts as 
humanizing enjoyment, I hope instead that the comparison above has been able to draw 
attention to the problematic situation that the arts in education faces. For, if education is 
framed today within scientific parameters, then art’s intrinsic qualities seem to be 
condemned to be viewed as second-class versions of bad science and definitively poor 
contributions to mainstream education. 
Alternatively, it could be tempting to suggest here that the arts are a somewhat 
necessary complement to the sciences, almost as if the arts produced the opposite picture of 
reality from the sciences, thus creating a balance between them and thereby enhancing the 
educational benefits of both. I believe that David Graves (2002), Professor of Philosophy 
and Art at Tel Aviv College, explains this completive effect of art in the following passage: 
Art may be an endlessly variable attempt to gain a unique perspective on the 
mismatch [between interacting object and subject] by creating artifacts that 
embody just that sort of dialectic […] Art investigates and hones the ability 
to figure out if, when, how, and why the analytical and the intuitive, the 
objective and subjective, the distinct and the confused, the said and the felt, 




If I am reading Graves correctly, in the best case scenario, the arts may 
actually connect the analytical with the intuitive, the objective with the subjective, 
the said with the felt, and eventually suggest a more complete and accurate 
meaning. This proposal certainly sounds appealing. But when I think of parents, 
teachers, and policymakers, I cannot help but hear the lingering questions: Will you 
be able to provide for an educational discipline of the intuitive and subjective? What 
does this completion and fulfillment of meaning have to offer to students’ 
education? 
Along this same line of thought, I think that Grave’s explanation of the arts 
helps identify another risk that goes even beyond intrumentalization: that is, the 
metamorphosis of the arts into a discipline. This is a subtle peril, perhaps based on 
some forms of aestheticism. From this point of view, the arts would become the 
domain of the intuitive, the sensitive, and the subjective: its own distinct discipline 
called “the arts.” The key problem is that restricting the arts to only these 
categories—that is, in the event we were indeed able to isolate them—would 
eventually reinforce their fracture with the sciences and other ways of dealing with 
human activity. What is more, if the arts become the discipline of the intuitive et 
alia, then we revert to the conundrum of how to teach them as school courses while 
respecting their core values, for what would a standard of the subjective and 
intuitive look like? 
In the current situation, I believe we need to try to recuperate a primordial 
sense of art. What this means, first of all, is to attempt the employment of both an 




the rupture between “science-based education” and the arts conceived of simply as a 
set of differing skills and/or disciplines.
10
 Plain and simple, I want to propose that 
art embodies the original unity between making and knowing expressed in the 
production of a work. In other words, the acknowledgement that art is at the base 
not only of some ways of cognition and production but at the heart of the human 
capacity of knowing and making. This is not a claim of chronological importance 
but rather the suggestion that, from a philosophical standpoint, art supposes a 
knowing-making disposition rather than the split consideration of either the 
production of things or knowledge. 
In calling art “a knowing-making disposition,” I am considering 
“disposition” in the etymological sense of dis-pono; that is, “setting in order” 
(Lewis, 2002). From this point of view, I believe there is an intimate relationship 
between what we may call “the capacity to know” and “the capacity to make,”—a 
mutual and intertwined “setting in order” that becomes manifest in art. Consider 
how in coming to produce any sort of work we often find ourselves deepening our 
knowledge of this very process and work. Conversely, we likewise find ourselves 
actually building mental or physical images of what it is that we are coming to 
know. 
We need to acknowledge, though, that nothing can insure that this ordering 
will come close to realization. It may indefinitely remain in a latent condition, 
                                                 
10
 By proposing this attempt, I am not denying that the sciences have actually become the 
privileged way of conceiving of education. But I believe that we, especially teachers, need 
to realize that the journey through each individual disciplinary study can only take us so far 
into contact with reality. Hopefully, recuperating such a primordial perspective of art will 




obscured by automatic reproductions of works or absentminded labeling of 
understandings. Still, we can reasonably expect that the realization of this vision of 
the arts will be well worth the effort. For, at the end of the day, what is at stake here 
is not only the place or role of “the arts” in “science-based education” but arts’ 
inherent relationship with human beings as art-capable and art-in-need beings: in 
other words, art as evidence of the cohesion of human capacities. 
Let us consider, for example, the crafts of those prehistoric cave dwellers 
that Picasso judged as having invented everything. What is it that these people 
found inside the Earth some 40,000 years ago? Did they discover the disciplines of 
the fine arts or the sciences somewhere in the dark? No, they had no light to see 
those things. They seem to have lacked the “maturity” to distinguish art from 
science. The truth is that disciplinary distinctions were irrelevant back then (in fact, 
they did not exist at all!). 
Let us imagine how their living conditions felt like. They were immersed in 
the gelid environment of the Earth’s last glacial period. Resources were abundant 
although they came with a cost. Sometimes the errand spark turned into wild fire, 
sometimes the hunting expedition, catastrophe. The fight for the very basics of life 
consumed most of the work of their minds and bodies. 
Still, they lived a human life, and they showed so. We cannot tell where it 
came from or how it started; maybe from the blood of the same prey that the clan 
ate together or from the crushed fruit of the wild bush; perhaps made of ashes or 




pigment and stamped her print on the wall, creating one of the first signs of 
humanity ever. 
The one quality of this activity that is decisive for us –and was obvious for 
our ancestors– is that in painting Lascaux’s caves they were deprived of the ability 
to abstract that differentiates between the elements of making and the process of 
making per se. Skills, technique, and materials meant nothing beyond the exercise 
of stamping handprints on the wall. Positively stated, they used reality to make their 
art, not heuristics. 
What we can see today on these cave walls are the painted drawings of bulls, 
deer, horses, and people emerging from the floor and apparently engulfing 
everything from the high dome. It feels impossible to be in the cave, watch these 
figures from a distance and assume a detached perspective. They seem to be 
everywhere at once, all around me; more precisely, they seem to be with me as I am 
watching. A primordial sense of art supposes, then, an activity in the process of 
being developed by human beings, using their own materials and tools: a process 
that unifies all elements in the same activity. We will further expand this point when 
discussing the qualities of poiesis in Chapter Four. 
A primordial sense of art also supposes a peculiar form of knowing that is, I 
believe, beyond the distinction between intuitive and discursive. It may be the case 
that Lascaux’s artists first intuited and then reflected or vice versa—or even 




indicate that knowing meant something closer to wondering than aiming at an 
explanation. Along these lines, let us bear in mind two aspects of wonder: 
On the one hand, how wonder moves us back to that point in the relationship 
with our own works where we and all those attending the work are newly amazed 
by its fresh meaning. On the other hand, how wonder, having placed us in that 
original venue, incites us to circulate around the work, as the cave artist has done in 
her multilayered renditions of animals and people, and as the viewer cannot help to 
do while walking in the underground chambers. 
Put differently, approaching knowing as wonder means revisiting the same 
work every time as if it was the first time. It supposes the possibility of seeing how 
an alternative way of meaning emerges before us, one that becomes opaque when 
we try to conceal it in definitive terms but seems to reveal in its fullest when we 
retreat, giving way to its peculiar splendor. We will continue developing these two 
points in Chapter Three when discussing the idea of respiration. 
Recently, Jeff Malpas (2006), Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Tasmania, has reminded how Heidegger brilliantly insinuates this double dimension 
of wonder: 
Wonder displaces man into and before beings as such… Wonder is the basic 
disposition that primordially disposes man into the beginning of thinking, 
because, before all else, it displaces man into that essence whereby he then 
finds himself caught up in the midst of beings as such and as a whole [,] and 
finds himself caught up in them (p. 295).
11
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 Malpas (2006) himself seems to paraphrase this argument: “In wonder, we encounter 
things in a way that is prior to encounter as any sort of relating to things; the encounter that 
wonder brings into view is just our being already with things, already given over to them 




Let us focus on those handprints on the wall, artworks of human hands that 
manifest how the work of an individual can echo across all figures and colors and 
still look always human. It is no surprise that most cave visitors are visibly struck by 
the strange familiarity of those hands. It seems easy to name what they look like. 
But how do they look that way? If anyone dares put his own hand on top of those on 
the wall then those prints become a literal expression of continuity across time and 
through the expansion of humanity. They become a “fact” of humanity, yet 
speechless, data-less, primordial.  
I think we can begin to see this in the way that Lascaux’s painters provided 
no contextualization for their works beyond the very works; the handprint seems to 
conceal its method and overall purpose. Perhaps the fact that these people spent 
millennia drawing the same images on the walls again and again is even more 
indicative of a concealment of meaning; for, there is no need to return to the same 
work if it is already complete or fully understood. It is as if those images allowed 
people to slowly taste some intimate vision, but only within a chiaroscuro and 
removed from what was clear under the light of the Sun. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter I introduced the idea of a primordial sense of art as a window 
into the arts’ “invisible” educational qualities. In the first place, I have attempted to 
surpass the mainstream tendency to frame the arts in education as a set of 
transferrable skills by highlighting the qualities that emerge from an inquired 




example of artistic qualities that may yield unique educational potential when 
illuminated by daily rehearsal. 
Second, I have tried to distill how these types of qualities allow us to see the 
arts as more than sciences, disciplines or forms of aesthetics. In particular, I have 
paid special attention to the arts’ proper traits in comparison to those of the sciences 
to make a case for the challenges that art education faces today for, if mainstream 
education seems to be modeled on a scientific conception, then the arts have to 
adapt to that framework or rediscover their genuine place. 
In the third place, I proposed to recuperate a primordial sense of art, a 
perspective framed by a making-knowing disposition where making supposes the 
unification of all productive elements, and knowing is closer to wonder conceived 
as rediscovering the work with amazement, and circulating around it to meet 
alternative ways of meaning. 
In Chapter Three I will introduce Constantijn Koopman’s “art as fulfillment” (2005) 
and Claudia Ruitenberg’s “art-that-is-other” (2002) as notions that emphasize primordial 
positions against the status quo of the arts in education. Then, I will propose Igor 
Stravinsky’s “respiration” (1975) as a synthesizing alternative to those previous ones. We 
will pay special attention to the way this latter perspective may help articulate an approach 
to art as educational per se rather than as an addition to or a detour from education. Finally, 
I will offer an art-based example that will assist in distilling three pedagogical implications 




Chapter 3. Art as respiration 
The field of Philosophy and Education has had an ambivalent relationship with the 
arts. After a major outburst of research and scholarship that peaked during the seventies and 
eighties through the work of scholars with diverse views, such as Monroe Beardsley, 
Nelson Goodman, Louis Arnaud Reid, there has been a tacit retreat before the results-based 
strength and public support of psychological perspectives. What was in principle aimed at 
inquiring about the arts as semblances of the good life, as instances for symbolic 
alphabetization, or as ways of humanistic knowing has given way to a scientific approach 
to the arts. As discussed in Chapter Two, based on current understanding of education, the 
arts have been framed as skills, disciplines, or complements to the sciences. 
The following chapter is an attempt to reevaluate the assumptions behind what is 
commonly understood to be educational in the arts by examining two intriguing arguments 
for their intrinsic value. I will first consider Constantijn Koopman’s “art as fulfillment” 
(2005) and Claudia Ruitenberg’s “art-that-is-other” (2002) as notions that emphasize 
primordial positions against the status quo of the arts in education. Then, I will propose 
Igor Stravinsky’s idea of “respiration” (1975) as a surpassing alternative to the previous 
ones. We will pay special attention to the way these three positions may help articulate an 
approach to art as educational per se rather than as an addition to or a detour from 
education. Finally, I will offer Maurice Ravel’s Bolero as an example that helps distill three 
pedagogical implications contained in this approach to art: the consideration of art’s time in 




“Art as fulfillment” 
In 1977, Hans-Georg Gadamer published an essay titled “The actuality of the 
beautiful” in which he discusses the phenomenon of art from the viewpoints of play, 
symbol, and party. In the third and final section of the work, “Art as celebration,” he 
characterizes two fundamental experiences of time. 
There is one type of time “for something” or “to do something.” This is the 
conception of time that supposes an original lack that needs to be filled in, as if from the 
outside. It is a time whose value depends on the quality of its occupation, for we can use it 
for better or worse activities. It is a time we can spend either in the boredom of not 
knowing what to do or the extreme business of doing too many things. This is the kind of 
time that follows a progressive trajectory from the past to the future, a time that we can lose 
or earn, negotiate or regret. 
Then, there is a fulfilled time that Gadamer exemplifies with the celebration of a 
feast, a happening that is both complete and actual. It is complete in the sense that it goes 
beyond the anxiety of navigating time between its use or misuse, lack or completion. This 
is a sense of time that positively affirms that a party congregates everything and everyone. 
This is to say that during the celebration nothing is missing and nothing is sought for or 
regretted, for the party feels already complete by the coming together of its members and 
elements. Rather than looking to be filled-in by occasional characters, activities, or things, 
the party already supposes “full-filled” time. 
Furthermore, Gadamer speaks of this time as being a present-based activity that 
“explicitly suppresses all representations of a goal towards to walk to” (p. 50). This is why, 




precisely, of the actual overruling of a succession of chained moments by an enlarged sense 
of immediacy that makes time stand still and invites us to linger together. The party is 
actualized time. 
Constantijn Koopman (2005), Professor at the Dutch Royal Conservatoire, builds on 
Gadamer and signals this dual sense of celebratory time as a paradigm for the way in which 
the arts best collaborate with education, arguing that “as an organized whole, the work of 
art embodies a mode of fulfilled time” (p. 92). Koopman grounds his argument on a 
collection of artworks whose intrinsic order seems to establish each part where they 
correspond. This is why they bring forth a sense of completion that, in lacking nothing, 
invites the spectator to sustain his engagement with them without tiring. These are the 
works that exemplify “art as fulfillment” both in the sense that they provide a sustained 
gathering with the work as well as an immediate experience of it.
12
 
As an example, Koopman refers to Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. What is 
particularly revealing in this artwork is that it is crafted in such a way that the person 
reading the text or attending the performance will eventually come to see the development 
of its plot, its characters’ motivations, actions, and speeches, and understand the drama’s 
meaning: that is, what constitutes friendship and betrayal. According to Koopman, in the 
crucial moment of the work 
There is a flash of insight […] intimated to us in the direct engagement with 
the work of art [where its] deeper meaning is suddenly revealed (p. 96). 
                                                 
12 Certainly Koopman (2005) is not alone. Senior scholars who have also tackled the 
crossroads between philosophy, art, and education, like Elliot Eisner and Phillip Jackson, 
seem to share this “fulfillment take” on art. For example: “The sheer joy of our interior and 
exterior landscape teach us what is to be fully alive” (Eisner, 2002). “On the making of art, 
the feeling associated with it is decidedly positive […] When might people rejoice in what 
they are doing? When they were deeply convinced of their importance. When they felt it to 




However, Koopman acknowledges the existence of “some works of avant-garde art 
that can be indeed very disturbing” (p. 92)—like the one we will present in the following 
section—and that pose a threat to “art as fulfillment,” for they lack the inherent qualities of 
completing order and meaningful immediacy. What should we do before such art? Try to 
contextualize its historic, political, or educational origins, for these works typically emerge 
as reactions against decayed dogma, oppressive regimes, or repressive methods. In and of 
themselves, these works may eventually contribute to an enhanced experience of what 
fulfillment in the arts looks like, but only as a negative rule, by exemplifying their defective 
incompleteness. “No one seeks disorientation in the arts any more than one does in the rest 
of one’s life. Eventually, we want something positive” (p. 92). 
The way in which Koopman further describes this quality of “positive art” helps us 
better understand his overall notion of “art as fulfillment.” Positive art seems to refer 
preeminently to an “existential experience [of] unsurpassed beauty, exceptional profundity, 
rapture and ecstasy” (p. 95). It is this type of experience that ultimately constitutes the core 
of Koopman’s arguments for the arts in education, for this experience raises the arts into the 
realm of fulfilling education: that is, “good life itself” (p. 96). 
 
“Art-that-is-other” 
Claudia Ruitenberg, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Education at the 
University of British Columbia, provides an alternative perspective to Koopman’s. Her 
point of view is that, regardless of their complete or immediate nature, those ways of 
dealing with the arts that aim at facilitating positive encounters hide a whole set of 
educational qualities that remain latent when they are explicitly needed in today’s 




works, we should concentrate instead on those works of art that are demanding, anomalous, 
and weird: 
I speak specifically of those works of art that address us from, as it were, 
another shore […] they are works that are called “difficult,” “strange,” or 
“unfamiliar,” works that we can ingest but not digest, that we roll around 
uncomfortably in our perception, like a hot potato in our mouth (p. 452). 
 
 
Before going on, it is important to highlight how the notion of “art-that-is-other” is 
rooted on the input of two authors that Ruitenberg has translated into the arts in education: 
In the first place, in Douglas Aoki’s “pedagogical politics of clarity” (2000), and 
specifically in his critique against the value of “clarification” as the teacher’s key task in 
education. Aoki denounces how those texts that elude easy comprehension or those that the 
teacher is not able to break down for her students are typically left outside the school 
curricula as too challenging. Ruitenberg expands on Aoki’s sense of a difficult text and 
includes artworks in this critique, pointing out that “in an order of teaching that prides itself 
on its pragmatism, works of art that do not disclose a meaning that fits well, or that do not 
disclose a meaning at all, are useless” (p. 456). 
Then, “art-that-is-other” would be purposefully complex and difficult to understand, 
refusing to “disguise its difficulty or the necessary incompleteness of its interpretation” (p. 
452). And this would not be just a whim, but a definite decision to bring back into the 
educational scenario the willingness to deal with what is hard to understand. More 
precisely, “art-that-is-other” seems to emphasize the educational value of dealing with 
those artworks that at first glance disorient us by calling into question the very conditions 




In the second place, Ruitenberg nurtures her thinking on Jacques Derrida’s critique 
of the “Western metaphysics of presence” in which he condemns the drive to assimilate 
meaning in a way that evades the actual complexities of what we consider “other.” 
Ruitenberg seems to read Derrida as attacking unilateral understandings of what is alien, 
understandings that mainly reference what is already known and that ultimately preclude a 
rich encounter with what we judge as “other,” specifically, the possibility to discover how 
that same “other” may unveil hidden common perspectives. This appears to be 
Ruitenberg’s point when she suggests that “art-that-is-other [teaches] to live with the 
uncertainty and barriers to transparent meaning presented by otherness” (p. 452). 
Thus, “art-that-is-other” should only be pursued as a lived experience with the work 
and not through some sort of translation; it should be almost completely self-referential, if 
not frameless. Ruitenberg acknowledges, however, that this type of art can only exist 
because of other works of art, and it can certainly be referred to, even in slippery and 
roundabout ways, other works of art. But there can be no direct interpretation of one work 
into another, let alone into a reality outside art. In general, “art-that-is-other” seems to arise 
as a reaction that emphasizes the reality of works of art “so unfamiliar and radically ‘other’ 
that the only adequate preparation may be to confess that we cannot be prepared for what is 
coming” (p. 452). 
An example may help clarify my reading of Ruitenberg’s intention here. In 1952, 
American musician John Cage composed a three movement piece titled 4’33’’, renowned 
because its score commands the performer not to play his instrument for the entire duration 




Before the actual performance of the piece, the audience typically sees a musician 
coming onto the stage and sitting at a piano. During the entire duration of the piece, the 
performer only moves to open and close the keyboard lid three times to differentiate the 
piece’s three sections. Then, the performance is officially over. This means that throughout 
the whole length of 4’33’’ there is no music being played, at least not in the usual way we 
expect music to sound. At first glance, one could argue that the purpose of 4’33’’ is indeed 
strange. 
Now, given the existence of a work of art like 4’33’’, it seems an educator would 
have the option either to continue describing the formal aspects of the work as if providing 
a framework to contextualize it and help the students understand what is going on during its 
performance, or perhaps attempt some manner of philosophical explanation that could 
justify this apparently silent music. Richard Taruskin (2009), Professor of Musicology at 
the University of California at Berkeley, has tackled both possibilities: 
Taruskin (2009) explains that Cage’s work does four things: Most radically, it 
confronts the long-established notion of silence understood as the lack of noise and the 
amount of silence that a musical piece may include within its measures.
13
 Similarly, it 
challenges the very definition of music by proposing an inquiry on whether environmental 
and accidental noises can be accepted as music, and, if so, under which conditions. 
Furthermore, it questions the traditional views on the authorship of music, for the noise 
                                                 
13
 It seems that right after the first performance of the piece, Cage himself attempted a 
similar justification, arguing: “They missed the point. There’s no such thing as silence. 
What they thought was silence, because they didn’t know how to listen, was full of 
accidental sounds. You could hear the wind stirring outside during the first movement. 
During the second, raindrops began pattering the roof, and during the third the people 





produced by each the members of the audience, together with the physical environment, 
actually compose and perform 4’33’’. Finally, it produces a statement on whether the 
audience’s reaction to a work is part of that work, questioning the social conventions of 
concert hall etiquette. 
However, regardless of the many interesting musicological and philosophical 
implications that one may continue to distill from 4’33’’, I think Ruitenberg’s point is 
precisely that in trying to explain works like this one based on what we traditionally 
understand music to be, and commenting on it with commonsensical, discursive language, 
we ultimately suppress or counterfeit the work’s “otherness.” We could take an exhaustive 
music history course on Cage’s 4’33’’, learn a vast amount of data about the work, and yet 
never actually experience the silent performance of the work, never learn a thing about or, 
more precisely, with the work itself.
14
 
As we referred to in Chapter 2, this may be the sense in which Merleau-Ponty 
(2004) states “It is more accurate to say that I see according to it [the artwork], or with it, 
than I see it” (p. 296). Art calls for a peculiar conformity between work and person where 
the emphasis is on their very relationship rather than on an object that needs to be justified 
or further developed. In this line, art seems to allow for the possibility to hold the world in 
suspense without delivering answers or explanations and yet suggesting an alternative way 
                                                 
14 Recently, Nakia Pope (2011) has argued that Cage could have hoped to incite some form 
of educational inquiry about 4’33’’ in the audience but that, ultimately, he did not have 
“much of an obligation to facilitate it” (p.117). I cannot agree with this assertion. If we take 
Cage’s words in footnote number Eleven seriously, and build on Ruitenberg’s “art-that-is-
other,” I think we can affirm that 4’33’’ itself constitutes Cage’s “argument” about music. 
Perhaps, “facilitating it” would account for telling the audience what to listen and how to 




of relating with the work, embracing all that visibly makes sense about it and what does 
not. 
If I am reading Ruitenberg correctly, without this nuanced approach to be with the 
work, teachers would invariably confront a dilemma when introducing an artwork in their 
classrooms: If they tell students what to see, they reduce their learning to regurgitating both 
the teachers’ insights and blindness. If they leave the students by themselves, they lose 
them and allow for no “positive” learning. I think “art-that-is-other” dismantles this “what 
to see, what not to see” tension, proposing instead an alternative perspective in the line of 
what Merleau-Ponty (2004) alludes above. 
If, instead of trying to name or solve the explicit meaning of 4’33’’, we take a step 
back into its reality as art, we may realize how this type of work helps to highlight the idea 
that what artworks present is not the same as what they represent. Put differently, works of 
art that are disconcerting may help us move pass the mere label that tells us what they stand 
for—or what we expect them to mean—and concentrate instead on their unmediated core 
significance. This is to say that in relating to 4’33’’, we may relearn to appreciate how art 




Reconciling “Art as fulfillment” and “Art-that-is-other” 
After considering both Koopman’s and Ruitenberg’s notions, I cannot help but 
agree that the primordial qualities of art that they describe are indeed educational. What is 
more, I think “art as fulfillment” and “art-that-is-other” together create an arch of intrinsic 
                                                 
15 Recently, Margaret Mason (2008) has continued Ruitenberg’s argument, highlighting 
“the transformational qualities of learning experiences that move through encounters with 
slippage, incoherence and evasion, and insist on engagement […] provoke new relations of 
thought and understanding within the processes of questioning and reconceptualization that 




justifications that bypass the actual conundrum of standardized methods and assessments 
and have the merit of opening new room for further inquiry on the arts as educational per 
se, while rejecting at the same time traditional instrumentalist views. 
However, I want to indicate that their distinctive emphases seem to emerge as a 
reaction against mainstream art education. This presents no complication from an 
argumentative point of view, for they artfully pick their adversaries to better portray “art as 
fulfillment” and “art-that-is-other”. What I find problematic is that in doing so, in defining 
their positions in opposition to current circumstances, their actual contributions become 
barely relatable, if not completely isolated from each other in real educational practice. 
This conclusion seems almost inevitable: If we are trying to highlight the arts’ 
potential to embody something like joyful completeness, this will be very difficult to 
reconcile with strangeness and paradox. Likewise, if we aim at illuminating how the arts 
present an alternative meaningfulness beyond conceptual boundaries, a way that assumes 
uncertainty and uneasiness as necessary qualities of art, we will have a hard time 
advocating simultaneously for the kind of existential fulfillment that the arts are able to 




Still, I believe this quandary comes from the heuristic tendency to reify notions like 
“art as fulfillment” and “art-that-is-other” as irreducible and independent qualities. This 
                                                 
16 To the best of my knowledge, John White (1998), Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of 
Education at the Institute of Education at the University of London, is the only figure in the 
field of Philosophy and Education that has dedicated some work to this issue. I want to 
argue, though, that White’s interest seems to rest on developing “a view of human 
flourishing [where] conflicts coexist within a unitary framework (…) this has its obvious 
parallel in the contrasting elements held together within the framework of a work of art (…) 
Art may speak (…) in its mirroring of our psychic constitution as a whole.” This explicit 




challenge could be overcome if we approach these positions as suggesting exemplary 
features that are not only present in all art but also bear a peculiar educational dimension 
when intertwined with each other. I think Russian musician Igor Stravinsky’s Poetics of 
Music (1975) contains some insights that may speak to this possible relationship. 
 
Stravinsky’s “respiration” 
During the academic year 1939-40, Stravinsky was invited to deliver the Eliot 
Norton Lecture at Harvard University, a venue in which artists usually provide a reflection 
on their own practice to a wide audience. On this occasion, Stravinsky focused each of his 
six lessons on specific aesthetic issues, some of which had to do with controversial issues at 
that moment, some others with the elements that constitute music as art. It will be relevant 
for our investigation to note that he decided to give the lecture in French. 
On the second lesson entitled “The phenomenon of music,” Stravinsky begins what 
I think is a philosophical inquiry on the origins of music, where he provocatively insinuates 
the notion of “respiration.” As if anticipating the emphases that Koopman (2005) and 
Ruitenberg (2002) would develop, he starts his argument proposing the existence of two 
types of music, the first of which he names “similar or unity,” the second “contrast or 
variety”:17 
One which evolves parallel to the process of ontological time, embracing 
and penetrating it, inducing in the mind of the listener a feeling of euphoria, 
so to speak, of ‘dynamic calm.’ The other kind runs ahead of, or counter to, 
this process. It is not self-contained in each momentary tonal unit. It 
dislocates the center of attraction and gravity and sets itself up in the 
unstable (p. 31). 
                                                 
17 Certainly, the tension between contrast and similarity do not match exactly the contrast 
that I see Koopman and Ruitenberg drawing. The point is that because “respiration” engulfs 
the interpretative extremes of similar and contrast, it could allow us to surpass the 




It is important here not to confuse these notions with either abstract or reified 
principles, for they seem to be interpretative terms instead. Stravinsky refers to them as 
“methods, like polychromatics and monochromatics in the plastic arts correspond 
respectively to variety and unity” (p. 32). The word choice is not capricious, for “method” 
carries the original meaning of the Greek metaodos, literally, “a way of doing something” 
(Liddell, 1996), not a finished or independently existing being. Thus, Stravinsky seems to 
be suggesting on the one hand that “similar and contrast” actually serve as ways of going 
about the practice of music as primordial criteria on how to approach artistic themes, 
materials, and techniques; and, on the other hand, that these are not exclusively musical 
methods but that we can find variety and unity in every art form. 
Furthermore, it is clear for Stravinsky that similarity and contrast cannot exist in 
isolation or be comprehended as dualistic-like notions. This seems indeed a false option 
that would denaturalize art, for “the coexistence of both is constantly necessary, and all the 
problems of art […] revolve ineluctable about this question” (p. 32). And still, in the very 
practice of art it seems we have to prioritize one of them. How can this be possible? Let me 
try to clarify this point with Stravinsky’s confession on how he deals with his own process 
of making music: 
I have always considered that in general it is more satisfactory to proceed by 
similarity rather than by contrast […] Variety surrounds me on every hand. 
So I need not fear that I shall be lacking it, since I am constantly confronted 
by it. […] Contrast is everywhere. One has to take note of it. Similarity is 




                                                 
18 Paraphrasing this same argument: “What it [similarity] loses in questionable riches, it 
gains in true solidity. Contrast produces an immediate effect. Similarity satisfies only in the 




One may be struck by the affirmation that contrast surrounds us while similarity has 
to be achieved through a sustained effort, something which is preferable in the end, at least 
for Stravinsky. There seems to be a tension here between similarity and contrast being co-
existent and having to favor one of them in the making of art. However, in the way I read 
Stravinsky, I think that the similarity he chooses as certainly more “satisfactory, solid and 
valuable” (p. 33) does not simplify what is unsatisfactory, unstable, and worthless but 
rather grants the conditions to assume both sets of qualities as complementary, as if 
thickening the density of how music could be. This is to say that regardless of the method 
one chooses to emphasize, the other one could be engulfed in a common process. Thus, we 
could understand similarity and contrast as interchangeably following “nearby and remote 
resemblances” –as we will develop in Chapter Four when discussing mimesis– rather than 
“identical and contradictory trajectories.” 
Without trying to force his words here, I believe this is precisely what Stravinsky 
argues when he further portrays the relationship between similarity and contrast: 
Like the drawing together and separation of poles of attraction [that] in a 
way determine the respiration of music (p. 36). 
 
 
A few words on the language of this quotation will justify the interest I have in it. 
Truly enough, the translator’s English word choice sounds awkward, for he is trying to 
literally translate the phrase détermine la respiration de la musique that Stravinsky used in 
the original version of the text. The rather old-fashioned “respiration” comes from the Latin 
re-spirare, literally “re-spiration” in English, that is, “the single complete act of breathing 
[composed by the aspiration and expiration of air into and from the lungs]” (Agnes, 2002). 




drawing together and separation of poles of attraction” (p. 36). This turns out to be a 
dialectic that, instead of destroying or dissolving its intrinsic elements, depends on them as 
conditions to sustain all music. 
Furthermore, the English translation may also bias our understanding of détermine, 
literally “to determine,” inducing us to assume contrast and similarity as setting the limits 
of music in the sense of constraining all musical possibilities in between them. Once again, 
the original French is revealing, for respiration can incorporate in French the English sense 
of “breath” (Agnes, 2002), adding to the mere act of breathing the opening of a room or 
time in which to exert respiration in new ways. I am prone to believe that Stravinsky is at 
least insinuating the notion of respiration as positively determining music, as if granting the 
conditions for musical possibilities to dwell in this breath. 
Put differently, what I believe this philosophical notion of “respiration” does is to 
reframe what we expect the process of music to be, granting the conditions to make music 
with the collaboration of previously unrelated extremes. An example will unfold the point. 
In the time Stravinsky was writing Poetics of Music, there was a major debate over 
consonance and dissonance in music: 
Consonance, says the dictionary, is the combination of several tones into a 
harmonic unity. Dissonance results from deranging this harmony by the 
addition of tones foreign to it […] Let us light our lantern! In textbook 
language dissonance is an element of transition, a complex interval of tones 
which is not complete in itself and which must be resolved to the ear’s 
satisfaction into a perfect consonance (p. 34). 
 
 
Paraphrasing the relationship between similarity and contrast, the issue at stake here 
was not whether the musical lexicon was wrong, as if dissonance and consonance literally 




the challenge was to adopt dis-sonance and con-sonance as another set of ways in which 
music could respirate. From this perspective, they both open new possibilities beyond how 
we normally expect music to sound. Consider, for example, how, in listening to music, we 
tend to resolve the chord that has been left undrawn or dissonant (p. 34) or how we seem to 
have a foretaste of the music that is yet to come (p. 54). Music does not claim to have 
something to explicate, and yet it breathes possibilities for us to choose and make sense of 
the work. From the viewpoint of “respiration,” it seems we can always reach for the unclear 
or incomplete in the work and assume its meaning in a way which is certainly not 





Respiration and education 
After considering the notions of “art as fulfillment,” “art-that-is-other,” and 
“respiration,” I think we are in the position to illustrate how Stravinsky’s perspective may 
lead into genuine educational qualities that could further enrich the current debate about the 
arts in education. Along this line of thought, I want to suggest that “respiration” impacts the 
quality of the room we concede to art in education, the amount of time art demands, and the 
overall sense of experimentation it offers. An example will help develop these three 
characteristics: 
                                                 
19 It is interesting to note Adorno’s (1964) assertion, “The cracks and fissures in Stravinsky 
were not defects or stimuli, but attempts to import this fiction into the work of art as a 
formal element. So as not to succumb to the fiction, he wished to make it audible to the 
reflective mind” (p. 214). I think that this effort to make music manifest the interpretative 
decisions that the composer takes —to make the “method” become the music— helps us 
approach not only Stravinsky’s music but revisit Cage’s 4’33’’ in comparison with Pope 




In 1928, Maurice Ravel composed Bolero, a sixteen-to-eighteen-minute piece 
originally designed for a ballet. It is a rather easy piece to remember once one has listened 
to it for the first time because of its obstinate rhythm. The pair of measures below shows 
the rhythmical heart of the music that a single snare drum constantly repeats—169 times—
throughout the entire duration of the piece: 
 
At first sight, it may seem a barely remarkable piece of music, an opinion sustained 
by Ravel himself (Orenstein, 1990): 
There are no contrasts [in Bolero], and practically no invention except the 
plan and the manner of execution […] [Bolero] constitutes an experiment in 
a very special and limited direction, and should not be suspected of aiming 
at achieving anything different from, or anything more than, it actually does 
achieve (p. 447). 
 
 
From the standpoint of Koopman (2005) or Ruitenberg (2002), one could be 
tempted to seek for justifications either in favor of or against Ravel’s statement: that is, 
either Bolero manifests a complete encounter with the work that eventually elicits a 
standstill feeling of euphoria, or it renders an opaque version of what music is capable of, 
leaving all those engaged with it with an uncomfortable sense of a lost opportunity to draw 
some meaning from it. 
However, from the point of view of “respiration,” I want to argue that Bolero can be 
viewed as a peculiar rendition of the relationship between those interpretations. Thus, let us 
focus on Ravel’s self-assessment and try to discover what the “respiration” of art can make 





“There are no contrasts” in Bolero 
What type of contrast do we expect art to illuminate? Imagine what would happen if 
we could listen separately each one of the rhythmical measures that build up this music. We 
would find then that they are all identical. No doubt. And I think Ravel’s self-critique goes 
along these lines. However, if we pay attention to the way these measures are being 
reformulated throughout the score and we listen to how the same theme evolves in 
resemblance, we see how it is never identical. In other words, every time the rhythm 
reintroduces itself, it both recalls the very beginning of the work from which it springs and 
projects the whole work into something other that is new while being always similar. 
The image of an explorer who travels across a piece of land he is trying to map out 
may further qualify this example.
20
 At first, he confronts a range of mountains and can only 
tell the difference between peaks and valleys and the arid and fertile areas. Although he 
really walks, he does not seem to be moving, as his gigantic surroundings appear to remain 
unaltered. But, as he progressively enters the mountains, step by step, he gains a clearer 
perspective that allows him to see more in the smallest details that build his scenario. 
Slowly, he realizes that the original curtain-like image of a single mountain range gives 
way to a profound variety of intermediate valleys that now populate his way. He certainly 
walks the same mountain but, every time, he walks an ever rich and diverse mountain. I 
want to argue that Bolero, together with those engaged with it, are like this explorer whose 
viewpoint becomes more acute as he keeps walking and discovering how to see new paths 
to travel. 
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 I came to develop this example while reading Gustave Thibon’s discussion on the ideas 




How this happens already accounts for the preliminary quality that a “respiration” 
approach to art can offer as educational; that is, illuminating unseen strata where there used 
to appear monolithic facts. Certainly, this thicker layering is not an issue of quantitative 
enlargement by the addition of information about the artwork but a peculiar expansion 
where our relationship with the work is no longer framed by what we feel or what we can 
say about it, but rather how we allow ourselves to meet different interpretative ways that re-
signify what a work of art means.
21
 
I am reminded here of Merlau-Ponty’s claim that the depth we meet in reality makes 
impossible the fabrication of something like a definitive perspective in art, that is, a final 
adequate way to see art (p. 306). All we can aspire to see are different thickenings, as if the 
artwork became a prism with which we could illuminate some aspects of reality while 
hiding others but we were never really able to see it completely. Put differently, as we 
referred to in Chapter Two when discussing the circulation quality of wonder, moving 
through the perspective through which we meet art supposes assuming that there are always 
new venues to discover but never a final avenue to ride along. 
In everyday educational practice, this layering of meaning demands the necessary 
room for students to move from conceptual backdrop-like views of the work into the 
discovery of its hidden valleys. In this sense, Ruitenberg (2002) offers a way of creating the 
necessary room to be with art that I find compatible with “respiration.” She argues that “a 
teacher does not establish a focus for listening to, looking at, or reading the work. Students 
are given the freedom and responsibility to be with the work” (p. 458). It is true that within 
our current educational environment the presentation of such a frameless learning scenario 
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will probably prepare students to expect something unusual, but I think the overall 
emphasis ought to be placed on seeking to open up room to be with the work. 
Certainly, both for teachers and students, this implies running risks like the explorer 
who is before the mountain. It may be the case that some take a picture of the mountain 
range after walking two steps, only to conclude that “This is the mountain.” Some others 
may choose to create a perfect map that resembles every nuance and yet still conclude the 
same as those before them. A group in the class may compose an “Ode to the mysterious 
valley” that states that no mountain can be actually known, only its partial valleys. Others 
will purposefully choose to “respirate” the mountain, and will inevitably get lost here and 
there, exposing unseen spaces and submerging others. As long as they decide to venture 
into the hills, wandering the valleys instead of responding to them, the mountain will 
eventually bloom with them, layer by layer. 
I think that art demands for the kind of space comparable to that in Bolero’s 
rhythmical pattern: While it expands, developing the music, it contracts toward the same 
original theme; while it allows us a foretaste of sameness, it surprises us with the gift of 
newness each time. 
 
Bolero has “practically no invention” 
The way we understand “inventive” is decisive here, for it seems Ravel suggests 
that Bolero is hardly a “creative deed” (Agnes, 2002), something we usually expect from an 
invention and are prone to demand from the arts in education. In general, it looks as if we 
searched for originality in invention in the hope of seeing something for the very first time. 
Still, the Latin etymology of invention, in-venire, literally means “what comes to us” or 




of the number of times this encounter may have already taken place in the past. Thus we 
can ask: What is it that we meet upfront in Bolero? A vast amount of repetition. 
Here, I would distinguish two ways of understanding repetition: On the one hand, 
repetition can be understood as the process that produces some sort of replica over and over 
again. This is the type of repetition mainly valued in terms of how well its product follows 
an original, and this is why we see a Rodin or Dali sculpture priced according to the 
number of copies available in the world. The extreme within this perspective lies in the 
technological over-stimulation of repetition that ultimately renders both original and copy 
flavorless, as in the case of “classic” artworks used as propaganda.22 We will return to this 
point in Chapter Four when discussing mimesis. 
On the other hand, we have repetition in the etymological sense of the Latin re-peto, 
literally, “to ask once again” (Lewis, 2002). What this means is that repetition is closer to 
reformulating a question on the same theme than to hammering a formless material into a 
copy. This take on repetition calls for a two-way relationship between the artwork and 
myself where both have the potential ability to speak to the other. —We will further 
develop this point in Chapter Four when discussing how poiesis supposes a relational and 
mutually creative process— In other words, repetition suggests a revisiting in the hope of 
dis-covering more than what was visibly available at first hand, for no one would ask again 
if he knew in advance a reply would be impossible. But the question still remains as regards 
how revisiting the same may allow us to find something new. Why not?! I want to propose 
that such a question is, in fact, invalid, for it frames the expectations about art within the 
linear trajectory of scientific progress we discussed in Chapter Two. 
                                                 




It seems we have the tendency to see a paradox in suggesting something like a 
“creative repetitiveness.” But let us consider for an instant the possibility of rejoicing with 
an artwork that resembles the same exemplar time and again. Let us perceive Bolero as 
challenging us to wonder what it is that Ravel saw in its theme that kept him coming back 
to it 169 times, as if asking the same question over and over again. 
I think Bolero is an example of those works that grant access to one of the most 
fulfilling senses of invention that art educators may find: that which emerges from dwelling 
with such a rich theme that one feels no anxiety to make something other than a portrayal of 
the same rendition. This may sound puzzling, but I believe this is not such a strange 
phenomenon if we move beyond Bolero and reflect on those sets of cherished works of art 
we all seem to preserve and revisit throughout our lives, as noted on Chapter Two when 
discussing the duration of prehistoric painting. It looks as if this repeated encounter with 




This act of re-visitation guides us to the second pedagogical consideration of art’s 
“respiration” because the opportunity to meet the work once again demands time, both in 
the sense of duration and of slowing down of perception. As duration, we can echo 
Gadamer’s consideration of time (1977) to justify that art cannot be framed within a lack of 
material time. To begin with, in the actual case of Bolero, this means having access to a full 
                                                 
23 As historic examples, I would like to include in this category the “still-life” that was first 
discovered in Egyptian tombs and is still taught in every Western art school. When people 





eighteen minutes to listen, that is, the piece’s original extension, together with the sufficient 
amount of “extra” time to linger with the work.24 
However, even in the case of actually having the necessary time to be with the 
artwork, the additional challenge with art is that it appears to require much more of our 
educational time. Eisner (2009) has recently indicated how this remains a paradoxical effort 
for mainstream arts in education where the persistent attributes sought in good students are 
typically those of being “bright,” “fast,” and “a quick read.” The former example of the 
explorer has serious implications here, for if we rush through the observation of art, we are 
more than likely to miss alternative paths or not have enough opportunities to get lost in the 
work in the same way that if we speed up the music’s tempo we risk confusing sounds that 
were supposed to be distinct and end up listening to a different piece than the one the 
composer created. 
Coming to terms with the amount of time an artwork requires from us also means 
that we must agree to a change of pace, a slowing down of our expectations. This is 
particularly relevant when considering art forms that evolve in time before our eyes like 
theater, environmental installations, and music in general. The fact of knowing in advance 
that the natural progression of time will lead to some type of artistic climax should not 
prevent us from allowing those instances to manifest appropriately, in time. Put differently, 
allowing for the possibility to inquiry the work once again demands awaiting the work, this 
means giving the work and ourselves the time to come to each other, and restraining 
ourselves from impatiently anticipating that movement. 
                                                 
24 It is worth noticing how most of Bolero’s versions are far shorter than the original, some 




I think this is another salient feature of Bolero because, with it, Ravel seems to 
purposefully slow us down. For, if we wait and give the music its proper time to develop, it 
will carry us from one measure to the next. Then, at any given moment, we may begin to 
discover how Bolero actually circulates its theme through all the orchestral instruments, 
steadily galloping toward a long crescendo of volume and harmonic intensity into a climax-
like tension that would have been inconceivable in the beginning of the work. In 
conclusion, after a necessary amount of re-visitation, the same theme will reach the very 
boundaries of what it can perform and go beyond the limits of a single musical key, 
changing tonality right before embracing its finale. 
 
Bolero, “a limited experiment” 
Finally, let us consider Ravel’s assertion that Bolero is a very limited experiment, 
for it accomplishes nothing other than what it actually does achieve. This claim illuminates 
another quality of art that holds an additional pedagogical suggestion contained in the 
relationship between experiment and accomplishment. The way in which we understand 
“experiment” is crucial here. 
As introduced in Chapter Two, there is a widespread sense of experiment, almost 
omnivorous in some areas of education that is archetypically represented by the scientific 
experiment. This is an experiment in the sense of a test in which a number of conditions are 
arranged in order to validate or refute a hypothesis. What is significant here is that these 
results constitute the experiment’s ultimate achievement, so that if the test cannot confirm 
or reject the hypothesis, it is worthless as such. In and of itself, this type of experiment is an 





However, there is an alternative understanding of experiment nurtured by the 
seemingly forgotten sense of “essay, rehearsal or attempt” (Agnes, 2002).25 I want to argue 
that from the viewpoint of “respiration,” Bolero embodies this latter sense of a rehearsal 
experiment. I say “rehearsal” in two senses: 
First, in the sense that a rehearsal is a continuous attempt. “Respiration” supposes 
the present, continuous, active voice form of art; as if one could say, in the style of 
Heidegger, “art respirates,” meaning that a work of art is a developing process, both 
physically and philosophically, rather than a worked or finished craft. Here, one could 
affirm that Bolero is in the making while it is being listened to or performed, as we will 
further develop in Chapter Four when discussing poiesis. This sense of rehearsal also 
speaks to art’s inherent incompleteness or, more precisely, “completing-ness.” Perhaps this 
is an easier quality to perceive in music, where the listener seems to carry with him all 
previous sounds and silences into what he is listening to at the moment, as if sustaining the 
whole of the work in progress as he listens. 
Second, I think we can approach Bolero as a rehearsal experiment in the sense that 
it attempts to swap the expectation of achieving some type of result beyond its music—a 
skill, an idea, a good—for the wondering inquiry with its music: as if the rhythms and 
melodies became the lens to see Bolero, and Bolero became the explanation for its music. 
Put differently, the work of art could become its own way of interpretation, as if cognitive 
methods and learning products became one in the work. 
                                                 
25 Although beyond the reach of our present investigation, it is interesting to note that 
within the educational traditions developed in Romance languages, this understanding of 
“essay” is still alive. For instance, instead of asking for a “paper,” Spanish-speaking 




In considering everyday educational practice, this sense of experiment takes art to a 
new level that comprehends the previous considerations of time and space. Imagine a 
classroom teacher inviting her students to listen to Bolero with the premonition that the 
music will not achieve anything different from itself. Students enter the gap of conceptual 
definitions that Bolero suggests, they slow down in its creative repetitiveness, they come to 
perceive more than they can properly name. Some agree with each other, some refute, some 
contradict. Yet, hopefully, the work becomes the master criterion of its own 
meaningfulness. It enacts the sole reason and motivation of its performance. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter I introduced the notion of “respiration” as a means to begin 
illuminating how a primordial approach to art may actually look in education. In the first 
place, I offered a contrast between “art as fulfillment” and “art-that-is-other” as 
perspectives that emphasize mutually exclusive images of the arts in education. At which 
point I moved to overcome their dichotomy through the analysis of Stravinsky’s 
“respiration.” 
In the second place, I stressed the way in which Stravinsky seems to suggest how 
the notions of “similar” and “contrast” can be approached as methods or interpretative 
lenses through which all art can be composed, performed and appreciated. I paid special 
attention to the fact that although in the actual practice of art we all seem to favor one of 
them, these ways are always coexistent, and that they positively determine the “respiration” 
in which art develops. 
Finally, I presented Maurice Ravel’s Bolero as an art-based example that helps 




that respiration calls for emphasizing a multilayered interpretation of art beyond the 
univocal perspectives we may find at first hand; second, the consideration of art’s time in 
education, both regarding its quantity for we need to secure the necessary time to allow the 
work to emerge and revisit it, and regarding its quality because we need to slow down our 
expectations about how the work will evolve; finally of its overall sense of rehearsal 
experiment, both in the sense that it is a continuous attempt, and that its practice becomes 
its actual purpose. 
In Chapter Four I will consider the type of learning we can expect from this 
primordial take on art. In order to do this, I will attempt to rediscover the educational 
potential concealed within Poetics by focusing on Aristotle’s insights on the specific 
pedagogical dimension of the arts. I will first guide our argument toward Aristotle’s 
remarks on poiesis, understood as a “process of making.” Then, I will focus on what 
constitutes the heart of poiesis, that is, mimesis. We will pay special attention to Aristotle’s 




Chapter 4. Art as an exercise in possibility 
The field of Philosophy and Education seems to be experiencing a renewed 
interested in the work of Aristotle. As recently reviewed by Randall Curren (2010), 
Professor of Philosophy at Rochester University, most of this attention aligns with the 
virtue ethics movement where themes like moral development in education, friendship in 
the educational relationship, the demand for public education, and the inquiry on human 
flourishing as the aim of education are prevalent. For sources, this scholarship relies 
heavily and extensively on the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics’ Book VIII where Aristotle 
develops his single, clearly defined account of education.
26
 Among the short list of scholars 
who include Poetics in their research, their work seems to return to issues of morality and 
education (Carr, 2010; Gupta, 2010). 
This chapter is an attempt to rediscover the educational potential concealed within 
Poetics by focusing on Aristotle’s insights on the specific pedagogical dimension of the 
arts. I will first guide our argument toward Aristotle’s remarks on poiesis, understood as a 
“process of making.” Then, I will focus on what constitutes the heart of poiesis, that is, 
mimesis. We will pay special attention to Aristotle’s consideration of both poiesis and 
mimesis as ultimately dealing with human possibility. I will finally provide an art-based 
example to show my interpretation of how possibility further qualifies the interaction 
between poiesis and mimesis. 
What follows, then, is an interpretation of Poetics, with the assistance of 
contemporary philosophers inspired by Aristotelic ideas on art and education. By 
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In any case, what we could call Aristotle’s “philosophy of education” is fragmented 
throughout his Corpus and may certainly be deformed by the variety of class notes that 




interpretation, I mean the mediation between two basic questions: What does Aristotle say 
about the arts in education? And what could that mean vis-à-vis our daily tasks as 
educators? Put differently, rather than composing a credible definition of what art education 
was for Aristotle, we will try to inquire into how art can be educational with the aid of 
Aristotle’s text. This is why we will heuristically distinguish poiesis, mimesis, and 
possibility to try to gain a richer perspective of the way these aspects come together and 





Written circa 335 BC, Poetics is Aristotle’s single elaboration on the nature of the 
arts and arguably the earliest-surviving investigation on the processes and rules of art 
making. Even in its current incomplete and fragmentary form, the text still exudes 
ambition: While the surface of the work deals with the main qualities to keep in 
consideration when producing a work of art, its underpinnings seem to suggest a peculiar 
relationship between poiesis and mimesis that is fundamental to learning. Aristotle 
introduces this relationship early on in the text: 
Poiesis seems to have sprung […] first from the instinct of mimesis present 
in man since childhood. One difference between him and other animals is 
that he is the most mimetic of all living creatures and through mimesis he 
learns his first lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in it […] The 
cause of this is that to learn gives the liveliest pleasures […] Thus, the 
reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness, is that, in contemplating it, they 
find themselves learning and concluding “Ah, that is it” (1448b 4-17).28 
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 I am aware that Poetics has historically stimulated Kantian, Hegelian, Croccian, and yet-
to-be-discovered aesthetic explanations. My own intention is, if not free from controversy, 
at least grounded on the arts in education as a practice-based stronghold that will hopefully 
keep my argument within the real life of educators. 
 
28




This passage is central for us and many of the following remarks will 
involve wondering about it. We will begin by approaching the terms poetic and 
poiesis. The move between both will be crucial for our argument because it will 
allow us to think of poiesis as a comprehensive process that goes beyond the final 
production of artworks. With this in mind, we will build on Martin Heidegger’s 
notion of tekne to illuminate how poiesis has a double dimension: First, it is a 
relational process that engulfs all elements in the process itself. Second, it is a 
human activity not only in the sense that it is developed by human beings, but 
specifically because it may reveal aspects of what it is to be a human maker in 
general. 
The etymological origin of poietic is the Greek verb poieo, literally “to make, to 
fabricate, to build” (Liddell, 1996); it is the root of the English “poetic” and “poesy,” which 
we understand as “something characteristic of poets” and “a poem or body of poems” 
(Agnes, 2002). It is from this viewpoint that Aristotle’s poietic is usually taken to mean the 
realm of artistic works, and one could argue that Poetics’ object of study is certainly 
Tragedy and Comedy, those forms of poetry composed to be sung as rhapsodies and music 
of diverse instruments—in general, the dominion of the Greek Muses (1447a 13-15). 
However, there is another Greek term also born from the verb poieo that Aristotle 
interchanges with poietic, that is, poiesis. While in English we tend to think of “poetic” and 
“poesy” as nouns or adjectives, poiesis carries a present continuous emphasis that allows us 
to interpret it as “the process of making” (Liddell, 1996). Thus, while Aristotle utilizes 
poietic to speak about the fields of drama, music, and dance, he also employs poiesis to 




of such a process. I think we can see this articulation in the very first paragraph of Poetics 
when he states, “I propose to discuss about the poietic itself: Epic, Tragic, and Comic 
poiesis…” (1447a 8-13). 
What I find particularly interesting about poiesis understood as a process of making 
is that it allows us to think of its many inherent elements as fusing in this same process 
rather than becoming parts of a product-making machine, so to speak. In the foreground, 
this means that all the artistic qualities that Aristotle distinguishes throughout Poetics (skill, 
technique, practice, artwork, etc.) could become synonyms of poiesis.
29
 On a deeper 
reading, this suggests that poiesis refers to the reality of art making as an assimilating 
process. By this I mean a process whose constitutive qualities can only exist during the 
course of the process itself; as long as it is taking place, those qualities are the process. 
As an example, let us consider tekne. This Greek word is the origin of the English 
“technique,” and is usually for Aristotle a synonym of “skill,” as exemplified in his many 
exhortations for poets to seek “artistic [tekne] correctness” (1461b 24). In general, out of 
the twenty-two times that he employs this term in Poetics, this is the usual sense that he 
gives to it. I think we can agree that there can be no art without skill and conclude that 
tekne is always a necessary component of poiesis. Still, as we referred to in Chapter Two, 
the fact that an artistic process demands skill is not sufficient per se to constitute it as 
poiesis. 
In our contemporary worldview, Martin Heidegger (1993) helps further clarify this 
point when he elaborates on the idea of two clashing interpretations of tekne. On the one 
hand, we can understand tekne as “a means to an end” (p. 308) where technical skills tend 
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 Even beyond Aristotle, the history of aesthetics is abundant with examples of how art can 




to emancipate themselves from the realm of human processes and begin to confront these 
processes as if from the outside. This is the perspective in which skills become autonomous 
tools and are prone to be subsumed under technologies. In addition, the overall criterion 
that guides these “means” is the ever efficient production of goods. 
On the other hand, Heidegger proposes tekne as “a human activity” (p. 308). 
Certainly this perspective also supposes the development of technological instruments, but 
their purpose is not to manufacture objects for consumption in the most efficient way 
possible. Instead, the emphasis is placed on “bringing forth” or “making present” (p. 329) 
the qualities that remain dormant within the conjoint activity of people and their works. 
Consider the following passage as a counterpoint between both points of view: 
The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears 
differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and 
maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In 
sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and 
watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field 
has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon 
nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the 





I think Heidegger’s underlying lesson is that both the “peasant” and the 
“mechanized food industry” represent ways in which human beings relate with their 
makings. In this example, they both have to deal with agriculture as their task, and 
to develop this enterprise they need to fabricate helping tools. The difference lies 
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 Although outside the reach of our present investigation, it is interesting to highlight that 
in What Is Called Thinking?, published in the same year as The Question Concerning 
Technology from where we take the quotation above, Heidegger has a passage in the first 
Chapter where he seems to introduce this same distinction between “means to an end” and 
“human activity” through the example of a cabinetmaker that learns his craft through his 




precisely in the quality of their relationship with the land and what they expect from 
it. 
While the food industry does care for the amount of produce it is able to take 
from the field, it could not care less how this process affects the land. Industry does 
not consider the soil for the sake of the seed; instead, industry works the land only 
in order to benefit from its fruits. Strictly speaking, there is no cultivation here but 
use alone, in the sense that once the nutrients of one field are depleted, the use of the 
adjacent field will inevitably follow. 
Conversely, more than aiming at producing goods from the land, the peasant 
seems to be concerned about ever sustaining this relationship with the land as a 
common task between the two of them. This should not be confused with naïveté, 
for to care for the land does not look different to the peasant than caring for himself. 
Without doubt, in time he will learn the seasons and weather, and the sowing and 
harvesting techniques that best help his crops grow. But, most importantly, I would 
risk saying that the peasant will eventually learn in a more profound way what it 
means to be a peasant, thanks to his relationship with the land.  
After distinguishing these two senses of tekne, Heidegger’s closing 
statement, “the poiesis of the fine arts was also called tekne,” (p. 339) allows us to 
further illuminate Aristotle’s poiesis. Heidegger’s claim is not just philological 
analysis but the expression of a reality that was tangible for Aristotle and almost a 
paradox for us: technique, skill, and technology—and all other artistic qualities—
are poiesis, conceived as the process of making an artwork. We seem to find such 




understand technique, skill, and technology as detachable from any of our makings. 
Furthermore, today, perhaps more than in any previous era, the way we relate to 
tekne defines the relationship we have with what we make, for this seems to be the 
tool every educated person should handle with mastery in her daily labors. 
I believe such a rupture would have been a chimera for Aristotle, and the 
way I see him bridging this gap characterizes the first educational indication we can 
learn from Poetics. Poiesis engulfs everything that we can at present think of as 
“art” or “artistic,” but not like fractions that build up something named “the work of 
art.” Poiesis is a relational process that sustains all its inherent elements while 
transforming them all in the process itself, in the way that plowing the land can 
neither be abstracted from the peasant’s care for it, nor from his hand holding the 
plowshare, nor from the seed growing into a plant. 
Heidegger’s description of tekne also helps us perceive a second educational 
quality of poiesis, that is, its framing as human activity. This is to say that the 
relational process of making a work of art is not just carried out by people but is a 
process that manifests aspects of human beings as makers. If we find this statement 
awkward, it is probably because we are too used to conceiving production as a 
unidirectional process where people subjugate nature and its elements. It looks as if 
a distant and generic “me” would exert dominion over the world of objects, as if I 
could challenge my surroundings with the assumption that there will be no reply 
whatsoever. 
Once again, I think such a fracture would have been fictional for Aristotle. 




Poiesis supposes creative reciprocity; it is neither an anonymous making nor some 
type of non-responsive control over materials. Put differently, in poiesis, the 
working peasant and the land make each other, for, in the way that the child 
becomes a peasant because of his working the land, the land becomes fertile soil 
because of its interaction with the peasant.  
At this point we have characterized poiesis as a relational process that 
supposes creative reciprocity. It follows naturally to ask what is it that differentiates 
poiesis from other forms of interaction between human beings and their works. I 
believe Aristotle would argue that poiesis must be mimetic. 
 
Mimesis 
Now that we have already introduced poiesis, it is important not to lose sight of its 
tight connection with mimesis; let us bear in mind that “poiesis seems to have sprung […] 
first from the instinct of mimesis” (1449a 4), and “through mimesis he learns his first 
lessons” (1448b 8). In this section we will unfold the meanings and relationships between 
these two quotations. First, we will tackle the etymology and translation of the key terms; 
second, we will pay attention to mimesis’ theme and its relationship with the development 
of likenesses as the actual matrix of possible learning through art. 
The Greek verb that I translated for “have sprung,” and which relates poiesis and 
mimesis in the quotation above, is gennao, and it literally means “to engender” (Liddell, 
1996). I believe this term allows us to read that poiesis comes from mimesis in a manner 
similar to breeding, as if mimesis was a parent to poiesis, so to speak. Strange as the 
description of this image may sound, I am persuaded to keep its biological reference 




fact that Aristotle calls mimesis an “instinct.” The Greek word is physis which we could 
also understand as “the nature” of mimesis, but it seems to me that this option would allow 
for all the complex nuances that “nature” carries with its interpretation. This is why I am 
choosing the alternative translation of “instinct,” for it sustains both the vital depth in which 
mimesis is located as well as its impulse-like capacity to bring poiesis forth. 
In addition, a first approach to the term mimesis demonstrates that its morphology 
very much follows that of poiesis: it supposes a present continuous sense. Its root verb is 
mimeomai, literally “to imitate, to represent” (Liddell, 1996), and Aristotle uses it to name 
both the realm of artistic makings— “Epic, Tragic and Comic poiesis […] are all modes of 
mimesis” (1447a 13-15) —as well as the process of developing those same artworks— 
Someone is “a poet because he exercises mimesis” (1451b 28). — For the moment, it will 
suffice not to rush into reducing mimesis to imitation or reproduction. Doing so risks 
dissolving its meaning into “something produced as a copy,” perhaps even with the 
negative implication of “counterfeit” (Agnes, 2002). 
Moving on, we can see how decisive the relationship between poiesis and mimesis is 
for Aristotle when he affirms “it is mimesis that makes the poet” (1447b 14-15). Without 
trying to force his words, it seems mimesis ultimately grants the conditions for poiesis in 
the sense that we cannot engage in the process of making a work of art without assuming 
mimesis as the criterion to carry on such activity. Mimesis is the distinctive quality that an 
artist needs to embody. Once again, we need to refrain from understanding mimesis as 
imitation or else we would be arguing for something like “the artist’s task is founded on 




However, the introduction of the poet as the one who is defined by mimesis gives 
way to the following question: If mimesis is not mere copying or reproducing things, what 
is it that the artist actually produces through mimesis that would be missing without it? In 
other words, how does mimesis qualify poiesis? 
The few explicit remarks that Aristotle has to offer in this sense point toward the 
same conclusion: Mimesis adds no “thing” to poiesis. Instead, it provides two conditions for 
poiesis. On the one hand, mimesis sets the theme for poiesis, stressing that it should focus 
on human life. On the other hand, and dependent on the previous point, mimesis suggests 
how that same theme ought to be developed through the creation of likenesses. It is only 
through these likenesses that mimesis would eventually favor learning. 
 
The theme of mimesis  
Let us consider Aristotle’s own explanation about what is it that constitutes the topic 
of mimesis: 
What the poet produces through mimesis are the actions of men (1448a 1). 
 
Tragedy is mimesis of praxis and life, not of men. And life consists in 
actions, and its aim is a type of action, not a quality (1450a 16-19). 
 
 
This is a good example of Aristotle’s ability to be concise and dense. It is evident 
that what the poet produces through mimesis are actions, and that these actions are those of 
human beings. But what are those actions really like? If we take the reference to tragedy 
above as a specification of the broad theme of mimesis, I think we can affirm that these 
actions cannot be reduced to isolated acts or accounts of people consisting in descriptions 




the expansive actions of people, practices that are continuous from the beginning until the 
end of life. 
Atsuko Tsuji (2010), Professor at the Graduate School of Education of Kyoto 
University, further clarifies this point when he suggests that ultimately mimesis cannot have 
an object to imitate. Building on Walter Benjamin (1999), Tsuji proposes that “objects that 
can be imitated cannot exist prior to the occurrence of imitation as mimesis” (p. 130). 
Mimesis favors an opening up of human possibilities rather than an identification of static 
objects one may take as exemplary models. In this sense, mimesis seems to be not only 
chronologically anterior to imitation understood as reproduction, but also a philosophical 
precondition for the making of all artworks. 
I believe Benjamin (1996) already insinuates this point when he argues that mimesis 
should not be a concern for the technical means of producing an artwork. Framing mimesis 
as production would risk reducing it to mechanical imitation;
31
 and, as we said before, if we 
could attribute technique to one of the notions presented in Poetics that would be poiesis 
for the productive emerges like a continuation of mimesis: 
All form, every outline that man perceives, corresponds to something in him 
that enables him to reproduce it. The body imitates itself in the form of 





I think Benjamin’s distinction between what corresponds to human beings and what 
we are able to reproduce based on that “co-respondance,” expresses in modern language a 
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 Although outside the scope of this investigation, one could argue that the essay “The 
work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction” (1985) denounces what happens once 
mimesis is reduced to a reproductive power. In particular, Benjamin argues that technical 
reproduction eventually subsumes and becomes the real art, fragmenting the former 








characterization of mimesis that we can only begin to perceive in Poetics. As we will 
develop in the next section, mimesis focuses on the possible correspondences between 
people and their makings. 
From this point of view, we can better understand Aristotle’s remarks on tragedy 
above. Let us consider a handy example like Romeo and Juliet. What is it that Shakespeare 
could be “objectively” trying to represent? Is the aim of the play to give an account of 
Elizabethan events and criticize the deeds of the Montagues and Capulets? Could we care 
less about the actual names or how they are rhymed or the actual place or time they 
occupy? Is not the true artistic skill in which Shakespeare excels his ability to make a case 
for what is human, with all its perils and glories, and to show how this story may relate to 
every one of us? 
However, by now someone could raise a real objection to our argument. What about 
works of art that do not seem to portray human life? Consider contemporary forms of art, 
for example an environmental installation like Christo and Jeanne-Claude’s The Gates in 
Central Park (see below). Being consistent with our argument, if this work was produced 
through mimesis, it should manifest human life. Instead, all we can see are lots of wooden 
structures with orange cloth hanging from them. Would Aristotle—should we?—refuse to 





I believe there are two possible answers to this legitimate question: On the one 
hand, one could read Aristotle’s claim that mimesis is about the actions and practices of 
human life as suggesting that the makings of every art—from whatever we may call “the 
most concrete” up to “the most abstract”—are implicitly a continuation of the mimesis 
instinct that all people share. In other words, there will always be human traces in art like 
there are aspects of the makers’ hand that somehow remain in the work even when he 
touches it no more. From this viewpoint, one could conclude that all art is mimesis because 
it is made by human beings and, therefore, repeat with Terence, “I am a man, nothing 
human is strange to me” (1998). 
The other possibility would be to argue, with the assistance of Politics’ last chapter, 
that artistic elements like “figures and colors are not the products of mimesis but [its] signs” 
(1340a 33).
33
 Here, one could read Aristotle as saying that the sensitive perceptions we feel 
are signs of mimesis, but not mimesis per se. In and of themselves, the combination of 
artistic elements does nothing for mimesis except provide its necessary material basis. What 
I believe defines mimesis’ theme as human life is not so much what is being portrayed in 
the work but how human beings participate in bringing forth some type of meaning through 
their interaction with it, assuming that same meaning as an echo of their own life. In other 
words, artworks need to provide for some form of relatable venues that could be assumed 
as human life. 
Think about what we could find out in considering The Gates as human life. Let us 
pretend we are in New York during the winter of 2005. The weather has been fluctuating 
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 Whether this same line of thought was present in the complete version of Poetics is a 
matter of philosophical fiction. Still, I think it makes sense to presume that the distinction 




between extreme snowstorms and gorgeous, sunny days. By mid-February, I force myself 
to be brave enough to go downtown and check that new installation people have been 
chattering about. So I take the inbound Red Line and get off at 59
th
 Street. In the moment 
that I set foot in Central Park, the rumor becomes real: all I can see are zillions of orange 
flags hanging over the walkways. It looks strange, to say the least. Still, my curiosity makes 
me move on. 
As I begin walking, I am not really sure I am doing anything at all beyond 
circulating around the park. It is interesting to note how what looked like orange flags are 
actually rising—or falling—curtains. And the color is not exactly orange, it is closer to 
saffron. Now, the wooden frames create a really nice effect. For, as you walk through each 
of the three-poled structures, you get the feeling of following a straight line even though 
most of the walkways are curved. This perspective illusion is due perhaps to the rectangular 
shape of the different gates. People were right: this might be crazy art, but it has some 
interesting aspects worth noting. 
However, as I keep walking, I somehow care less for what I see and begin 
wandering through The Gates. It is not easy to say why, but this entering and exiting each 
of the gates has some ineffable qualities that speak to me, perhaps because there are gates 
we go through in life and curtain calls we attend. There are some curtains that slap us in the 
face and oppressive backdrops that rise behind us; there are ripped curtains we break 
through and curtains we take down as the show of life goes on. As time goes by, I spend the 
day strolling through The Gates.
34
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 I am aware that Rene Arcilla (2009) has recently argued that modernist abstract art serves 




As usual, the example could be improved, but I think that walking around in The 
Gates accounts for the perspective from which we can approach mimesis’ theme. Further 
objections could be raised, claiming that this is the same as relating anything to human 
beings. But such is not the case. As we will argue in the last section, many different things 
could possibly be related to human beings, but this very possibility depends, first of all, on 
discovering qualities that could operate as semblances between the work and me. 
 
Mimetic likenesses 
Consider how mimesis grants the conditions for the very first learning experience of 
human beings: 
Through mimesis he learns his first lessons; and no less universal is the 
pleasure felt in it […] The cause of this is that to learn gives the liveliest 
pleasures […] The reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness, is that, in 
contemplating it, they find themselves learning and concluding “Ah, that is 
it” (1449a 15-17). 
 
 
What specifically qualifies learning in Poetics is its dependence on “a likeness.” 
Now, “likeness” comes from the Greek eikon from where we receive the English “icon.” 
But, while in English we tend to understand icon as “a pictorial representation or image” 
(Agnes, 2002), the Greek in Aristotle’s times sustained the multifaceted meaning of eikon 
as “likeness, semblance, and similitude” (Liddell, 1996). This is why I chose to translate 
eikon as “a likeness” to stress that it refers not to some “re-presented” or “re-produced” 
object but rather to a relationship between different things, a quality that cannot exist 
separately from them and can only be actualized by the simultaneous interaction of those 
two realities. As commented on above, mimesis supposes the means to produce these 
                                                                                                                                                     
process but an opening into the opportunity to re-familiarize us again with ourselves. In any 




likenesses, but, specifically, mimesis seems to concern for the development of these 
likenesses as such: likenesses seem to be the actual “product” of mimesis. 
It is important to highlight, though, that while the mimetic development of 
likenesses seems necessary for learning, the existence of likenesses between the work and 
myself is not sufficient to constitute learning. It appears as if all the artist could do is to 
arrange his work in such a way that these semblances between different realities could 
possibly be illuminated, and yet, they seem to be expecting, as if gravid, a personal vision 
that could then give way to the conclusion, “Ah, that is it.” In other words, mimesis is 
necessary for learning, but not sufficient for it.  
In my view, this interpretation is strengthened by Aristotle’s use of the term orontes 
as an adjective of eikon. In the quotation above, what people enjoy is “orontes eikon,” that 
is, “seeing a likeness.” Orontes is the active gerund of the Greek verb oreo, literally “to 
see” (Lidell, 1996), which then allows us to read that it is in the process of seeing a likeness 
that human beings may be able to learn something. Learning does not depend on a likeness 
that has already been seen or will be seen but on seeing a likeness become a likeness, so to 
speak. 
As Christine Doddington (2010), Senior Lecturer in Education at Cambridge 
University, states:  
It is not the veracity of likeness that is key to judgment here, but what the 
artwork can eventually reveal beyond mere replication of appearance—the 
unseen that is made visible—[…] [We should not] overlook the process and 
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I think this quotation helps synthesize our argument and suggest the main 
educational contributions mimesis has to offer. First of all, Doddington reiterates 
Benjamin’s and Tsuji’s point regarding the relationship of mimesis to the 
reproduction or replication of objects. What mimesis does is to emphasize 
resemblances to be perceived between realities, not blurry labels to be verified 
against a map legend. This is to say that its process implies tracing possible 
relationships, the “unseen that is made visible.” It supposes the disclosure of 
connections that would have remained hidden if this particular artwork would not 
have suggested them. 
Mimesis also highlights the effort that such a task entails because “looking to 
recognize” supposes that we dispose ourselves to “re-knowing” what we thought we 
knew in an original way, a mimetic way. This does not mean to make what we 
recognize fit our previous scheme, rather the opposite: it allows for the possibility of 
re-learning something in a way that reformulates what we knew. Put differently, the 
seeing of likenesses is a life-long opportunity to reveal new likenesses each time. 
Romeo and Juliet is once again helpful here. Consider someone being 
exposed to this play for the first time. A late sixteenth-century play written in old 
English rhyme. A plot consisting of two noble families whose common animosity 
ends up taking the lives of both their heirs. The whole tragedy sparked by the fact 
that a friar’s letter never made it to Mantua in time. By the way, where’s Mantua? 
And why didn’t someone call Romeo to let him know the plan to have Juliet sleep 




learning through mimesis seem to be too many; as commented on above, suggesting 
a likeness does not guarantee learning. 
Then again, if the audience remains in their seats, some signs of revealing 
recognition may occur. Consider Capulet, that aggressive and hateful father. A true 
tyrant! But is it aggression and hate that best characterize him? He seems to be sorry 
for the bygone days, the good old days, somewhat melancholic. And in comparing 
his wife to Juliet, he speaks of withering beauties that are too early harvested. This 
man is the head of a family clan, and he has only one daughter. He probably wants 
her to be happy but knows well in advance that the human condition is subject to the 
miseries of time and fatigue. How do we help someone we love to grow up in a 
world filled with pain? 
The example is certainly improvable, but I believe the point is clear. All 
forms of learning through mimesis are embodied in a version of Aristotle’s, “Ah, 
that is it.” In this case, “it” does not have to be a Capulet or a Juliet, it could very 
well be a feeling we do not yet have a name for. It could be a mixture of emotions 
with melancholic qualities. It may read as “melancholy” in the text but speak to the 
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 Someone might argue that I am talking here about learning through catharsis rather than 
through mimesis. However, I would like to bring attention to the following considerations: 
In the first place, in Poetics, catharsis is exclusively restricted to tragedy: “Tragedy is 
mimesis of praxis […] accomplishing through fear and pity the catharsis of these same 
emotions” (1449b 24-28). There would be no catharsis about The Gates, for example. What 
is more, of all the sixty-six times that Aristotle uses any compound of this word in his 
Corpus, he only utilizes catharsis twice in Poetics. In his biology treatises, where he uses 




So far, we have established that the type of learning that Aristotle describes 
in Poetics is framed by mimesis’ double suggestion: On the one hand, looking to 
recognize human-like semblances in the artwork; on the other hand, revealing new 
aspects of those same semblances. Mimesis allows us not only to see the artwork 
under a new light but also to wonder about the resemblance-like relationship we 
develop with the work. It is as if through mimesis we were able to approach the 
artwork as something other, something different from us that nonetheless insinuates 
a certain correspondence with us, as Benjamin (1996) and Doddington (2010) 
argue. 
Two questions seem to follow: What is it that differentiates mimesis from 
relating anything that could allegedly be called human with any random 
resemblance we may find in the artwork? And how would we characterize mimesis 
as a perspective on art that educators can manage to identify and help students 
develop while remaining true to Aristotle’s indications? I believe Aristotle would 




                                                                                                                                                     
typically, milk, blood, the placenta, semen, ovules, etc. Thus, I would argue that catharsis is 
more of a modern scholar’s concern than an Aristotelian one. 
In the second place, catharsis is only about the cleansing of pity and fear. This is 
problematic when considering tragedies that depend on other feelings. For example, the 
likenesses that were revealed in re-experiencing Capulet’s character would be outside 
catharsis’ realm because they seem to be closer to love or melancholy. 
Finally, it is not clear what happens with these passions once they are released, for it 
appears the spectator has no opportunity to revisit them. Put differently, whatever we may 
learn from tragedy—if anything at all—we would be deprived of reevaluating pity and fear 





In this final section, I wish to make a case for possibility as a quality that further 
expands the understanding of both poiesis and mimesis as conditions of the types of 
learning that Aristotle suggests in Poetics. We will first attend to Aristotle’s 
characterization of the possible as that which distinguishes poiesis from history. Then I will 
present the notion of art as an exercise in possibility, embodying two complementary 
qualities: On the one hand, the framing of the possible within a single concrete work of art; 
on the other hand, the expansion of that same possible as a standard that helps “re-
appreciate” previous makings and prepare future ones. 
As we have seen in the previous section, Aristotle introduces the notion of learning 
in Poetics as related to a preliminary insinuation of human likenesses. We showed how the 
development of these likenesses—of the conditions that allow us to see them—is what 
constitutes the work of the artist as mimesis. What is still ahead of us is to find out how this 
development looks in practice. Aristotle has a straightforward characterization of this task: 
It is clear from what has been said that the poet’s task is not to narrate what 
has happened but what could happen, what is possible […] The historian and 
the poet do not differ by writing in verse or in prose (Herodotus might be put 
into verse and it will still be history with or without rhyme). The true 
difference is that one narrates what happened, the other what may happen. 
Poiesis, therefore, is more philosophical and noble than history (1451b 1-5). 
 
 
Understanding who Herodotus is for Aristotle will help us make sense of this 
passage. This is the only time that Aristotle mentions him in Poetics, and he names him ten 
times in the Corpus that reaches our era. In each instance, Herodotus is quoted as an 
authority regarding the past, the famous world traveler and author of the Nine Books of 




“learning by inquiry” (Liddell, 1996), Aristotle’s use of the term appears to be 
circumscribed to “an account of one’s inquiries, a narrative” (Liddell, 1996). For example, 
in the treaty On the Generation of Animals (1952), Herodotus seems to be just a narrator of 
his experiences and past life events, essentially a “storyteller” (756b 6). 
But the narration of the past as such is not what condemns history as less 
philosophical than poiesis. What is decisive here is that history deals with events that 
happened regardless of their probability, whereas poets make something that is possible 
happen. “Even if the poet takes a theme from actual history he is nonetheless a poet for 
some historic events may be probable and possible” (1451b 29-31). It seems as if, for 
Aristotle, history is a static reality materialized by actions that originated in the past and 
were fully over in the past; already accomplished facts, so to speak. The only thing we 
seem to be able to do with it is to retell it and, even if we can relate to it and find 




The activity that the poet carries out is of a different nature: it is mimetic poiesis, 
after all. We should take into account that most of the examples that Aristotle utilizes in 
Poetics come from the early Greek rhapsodies of Homer, Aeschylus, and Sophocles. In 
their works, these artists have not copied the facts of history as if they were chronicles, nor 
have they produced accounts of human life that people would find impossible to relate to. 
What they have done is to create images of the possible: exercises in possibility that their 
contemporaries and we can relate to while considering different qualities of resemblances. 
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 Although the nature of history is outside the scope of our investigation, it is fair to 
acknowledge that Aristotle’s research style typically included a brief literature review. This 
critical evaluation was located as an introductory chapter and used as the stepping-stone 




Once again, it is helpful to keep in mind both Romeo and Juliet and The Gates as examples 
of how Aristotle’s sense of mimetic poiesis might look today. 
Moving on, we can argue that what makes mimetic poiesis “more philosophical and 
noble than history” is its engagement with “the possible,” “ta dunata”  (Liddell, 1996) as an 
attempt to present “what could happen.” It is not sufficient to conceive poiesis as a 
relational and two-way creative process; it is not enough to suggest likenesses to be seen; 
mimetic poiesis needs to be effectively possible. Put differently, the type of learning that 
Aristotle refers to in Poetics is not only qualified by a peculiar way of relating with the 
work nor only by the philosophical suggestion of likenesses but also by manifestly 
affirming possibility as a necessary element of this learning’s coming into being. 
But how does an exercise in possibility look in everyday arts education practice? I 
think there are two suggestions that emerge from Poetics: the first explicitly regarding how 
to frame the possible; the second insinuating how to expand it. 
 
Framing the possible 
This is no word game but the practice-based demand to set coordinates from where 
to exercise possibility in art. Along this line, Aristotle has only one piece of advice to offer: 
try to develop “probable impossibilities” (1460a 27) or what supposes concentrating on a 
single human action and distilling its salient elements. Once this is accomplished, the poet 
can highlight its potential implications, bearing always in mind that no matter how 
expansive this could turn out to be, it should remain within a single concrete work: meaning 






 In other words, there is a call here for the poet to demonstrate the sufficient 
commitment to resist producing something too ambitious, as if attempting to make a map of 
the same size of the territory. There is no need to try to seize all possible possibilities; the 
effort should be placed instead on finding which are actually worth pursuing each time. 
According to Aristotle, this is the perspective on possibility in which Homer 
outshines all other artists. Consider how in the Iliad he focuses on the very last moments of 
the war for Troy. One is even tempted to name these moments after Achilles, Hector, and 
Ulysses, whose probable impossibilities are still known to us: Brave Achilles’ hubris-driven 
fight with Hector over Patroclus’ death, his shield’s description, and the fatal ankle wound; 
noble Hector’s love and sacrifice for his father and homeland; Ulysses’ perspicacious horse 
trap and temerarious offense to Neptune. Thousands of pages of drama masterfully centered 
on these basic actions! These are the fundamental possibilities that have allowed all 
posterior imaginations to ruminate on the name “Troy” with a sense of admiration that is as 
alive as ever. 
Now, let us consider what this “probable impossibilities advice” means for a teacher 
who has to select and/or produce the artworks she wants to introduce to her students. It 
seems to me that regardless of her curriculum development strategy, we could all agree that 
she will seek for works that will help the class deepen their integral sense of what art is. It 
is as if she was looking for a prism that could help students see diverse possible 
perspectives, all coming from this concrete work. Put differently, she will look for what has 
more potential vis-à-vis her students; she will seek to find those works that may insinuate 
more probable impossibilities for them. 
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 For example, in describing the demands of tragic writing, Aristotle indicates, “The 




I think it is crucial here not to transform the notion of “probable impossibilities” into 
some reified criterion that will be easily assessable and later transformed into a new 
standard. Let us keep in mind that in Poetics the notion of possibility depends on mimetic 
poiesis. This is to say that seeking for probable impossibilities supposes, inevitably, the 
organic development of the process of making art and seeing new resemblances in it. I 
believe this allows for different layers of possibility for the teacher to pick: it may be the 
case that she chooses to emphasize the relationship with the work in the making; or with its 
past, present and future resemblances; she may also decide to emphasize the way in which 
she presents the work and—in line with our discussion of Stravinsky’s “respiration”— the 
interpretative methods that help making sense of it. Put differently, I think Aristotle’s 
greatest input here is trying to present mimetic poiesis as a true crystallization of possibility. 
 
Expanding the possible 
However, what we just said could easily raise an objection: How can we guarantee 
that these specific individual works—or emphases on a work—will effectively expand our 
students’ horizons, allowing them to see more than what is visibly at hand? In other words, 
what will prevent our class from simply bogging down into this work regardless of its 
possible-like qualities?  This is a real risk, no doubt. Aristotle seems to refer to it when 
narrating the common incident of a tragic writer who, having masterfully reached the 
climax of his work, fails to develop its consequences towards the end of the story.
39
 
However, the question here is not about producing a recipe to successfully spark possibility 
in art and education, but to suggest how the transition from framing the possible into 
expanding the possible may look like. An example will help illuminate the point: 
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Tradition has it that when presenting his portrait of Gertrude Stein in 1906 (see 
below), Picasso was attacked by a group of critics who argued that the work did not look 
like her. He is said to have replied, “Never mind, it will!” This story, introduced by Elgin 
(2002), helps to highlight the educational potential that I find concealed within Aristotle’s 
sense of possibility by stressing how mimetic poiesis operates as a concretion of possibility 
and, at the same time, as a dynamic standard of that same possibility. 
 
Let us approach these pictures as exercises in possible renditions of Fräulein Stein. 
Can you see the sharp nose and deep sight? The tense gesture? No? Yes? Wait! What Stein 
are you looking at!? What Picasso does is precisely to offer a new version of Stein where 
some details are emphasized and distorted while others are deleted or minimized. This 
seems to be what the public saw during the painting’s inauguration—the same thing that 
students could complain about— that this painting is a possible interpretation of Stein but 
not a portrayal of the way Stein was supposed to look. 
I want to argue that art as an exercise in possibility sets on fire the expectation of 
what art ought to look like while suggesting a concrete alternative to ponder. In other 




relationship with the work and the development of resemblances with it, that is, mimetic 
poiesis. It is not just that in producing the painting of Stein Picasso makes her image reach 
the status of probable impossibility, but that in doing so it allows for further wonderings 
around the image that will in turn originate other resemblances that will continue making 
sense of this work in new and different ways. 
And in expanding this sense of possibility, the image also sets a standard for new 
possibility. Consider how, after looking at the painting, we gain a new vantage point from 
where to see Stein. Did she look more tired in the painting or in the photograph? Did she 
look older more than tired or more absorbed than old? It is not just that we gain a new 
standard for Stein, but through this painting, we are now able to relate to other works of art 
and other people who would not have looked like Stein without Picasso’s creation (Elgin, 
2002). In other words, if we have engaged in poiesis and we found some mimetic 
resemblances between the work and ourselves, then the work of art will not remain 
indifferent and we will carry it as a standard of future resemblances to unveil. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to present the pedagogical insights contained in 
Aristotle’s Poetics. In the first place, I suggested the possibility of conceiving 
poiesis as the process of making an artwork. Here, I identified two salient qualities: 
that poiesis can be understood as a relational process that assimilates all elements 
while the process is being developed, and that this same process supposes a creative 
reciprocity that qualifies both maker and her work. 
In the second place, I stressed the prominent attributes of mimesis. On the 




a deeper reading, mimesis grants the conditions for learning with art for it allows to 
recognize human-like semblances in the artwork, and to go on revealing new 
aspects of those same semblances. 
In the third place, I suggested how the notion of mimetic poiesis is further 
qualified by Aristotle’s idea of possibility. On the one hand, possibility demands for 
concretion in art, in the line of what Aristotle calls “probable impossibilities.” On 
the other hand, possibility seems to constitute a peculiar standard from where to 





Chapter 5. Illuminating the work of students’ and teachers’ in art education 
Thinking about a conclusion, I would like to revisit two school experiences that I 
consider exemplify some of the opportunities that may emerge from seeing art in the ways 
that we have discussed throughout the dissertation. 
The first example will allow us to relate poiesis and a primordial sense of art, 
notions that we introduced in Chapters Four and Two respectively. We will consider how 
their distinct perspectives may help illuminate the everyday practice of teachers and 
students working with art. I will argue that the interaction between both notions help 
emphasize the relationship of teachers and students with the materials and processes of 
making art. Also, I will show how from this position teachers are able to recuperate a 
wisdom-based understanding of their disciplines that allow them to transform their scopes 
and possibilities. 
The second example will relate respiration and mimesis, notions that we introduced 
in Chapters Three and Four respectively. We will proceed in the same manner as in the first 
example. I will argue that both notions help open up room where to develop new and 
meaningful interpretations of the artwork through the development of human-based 
resemblances of it. 
We will provide special attention to the way both examples help recuperate the 
conclusions at which we arrived in each Chapter, and present them under the light of 





The sound of music 
“It was a sunny Friday afternoon, first period after lunch. About thirty five 
students were gathered in the library practicing their lines and tuning (if not 
fixing) their musical instruments. Teachers, other students, the head of the 
school and a few parents looked on hoping that the performance would 
work. Unique about this concert was that the music as well as the African 
instruments themselves were created by the students. As the show began, a 
timid strings section alternated with dominating percussion variations, which 
in turn enlisted the winds in their rhythmic motifs. All, while the budding 
instrument makers mixed concentration, nervousness and pride in their 




The above quotation describes the premiere performance of “The sound of music,” 
an interdisciplinary research project in which I took part in 2007 as research assistant, and 
was aimed at developing connections between music and physics at the International 
School of Uganda in Kampala. In this arts-based experiment, eight grade students pursuing 
an International Baccalaureate Diploma were supposed to simultaneously learn music and 
physics through the construction of their own musical instrument, while the teachers of 
each course developed a set of collaborative activities to facilitate that learning.
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It is important to highlight that this project’s intention “went beyond using music to 
motivate student learning in physics” (p.1). It rather sought to show students how 
appreciating sound as music and as wave through the actual fabrication of a musical 
instrument can yield a thicker and more integrated comprehension of what it looks like to 
know and make anything from the point of view of music and physics. In the language that 
we have developed in Chapter Two, I would say that students began making their 
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instruments as they began knowing music and physics, and conversely, that they began 
knowing music and physics as they began making their instrument. 
From the very outset, this project presented students and teachers with unique 
challenges. To begin with, students were supposed to learn the physical qualities of sound 
considered as a wave that propagates through a material medium. In order to do this, they 
had to go through a series of experiments that included understanding how a ship’s sonar 
work both under the water and in open air, and how the speed of sound varies according to 
the medium it is running through (p. 15). 
In addition, to discover the musical qualities of sound each of them had to build a 
musical instrument using natural and native materials, and learn how to play it in an 
ensemble. For this purpose, a diverse group of folklore musicians visited the school and 
shared with the students their impressions about the tasks of building and learning how to 
play their own musical instrument. It will be significant for us to stress that this was the 
very first time in their lives that these pupils encountered a formal venue where they were 
asked to learn music and physics, both considered as isolated disciplines or working in 
collaboration (p. 8). 
As regards the teacher themselves –who had shown interest on the project from the 
beginning and proved as valuable collaborators all the way through– we asked them to 
develop this curriculum not only in formal collaboration but also to spare the necessary 
time to be present at their colleague’s classes, ready to jump in whenever the conversation 
expanded from one field into the other. It will be relevant for us to indicate that neither of 
them was an aficionado to the practice of her colleague’s area –The physics teacher just 




something “too alive”–. Also, both instructors were people with years of experience in their 
fields and an outstanding record of teaching excellence at the International School of 
Uganda (p. 8, 15). 
Now, what does it mean to begin to know music and physics while building your 
own musical instrument? One way of approaching this question comes to mind: 
In the first place, I remember a student that decided to make a drum (p. 7). In 
Uganda a drum is serious business, the ‘national instrument.’ Drums are used to celebrate 
each of the stages of life –there are different types of drums in births, graduations, 
marriages, and funerals–. In fact, in Uganda everyone seems to know how to make a drum. 
For example, out of my observation, these are the mandatory steps to make a drum in 
Uganda: First, go and pick a tree, cut it. Choose an area of its trunk, cut it and empty it 
leaving only a wood cylinder. Then, cover the extremes of the cylinder with two cow skin 
lids and tense these lids using stripes made of the same cow skin. Granted, now you have 
something to hit with your hand and make sound, what I thought would satisfy the notion 
of drum. 
However, the traditional emphasis is that the drum maker needs to be able to model 
and recognize its peculiar sound or else it will not become her drum. In the words of a 
traditional drum maker that visited the school during the project “each drum has a heart,” a 




I believe that this demand to appropriate the drum helps manifest how what we said 




On the one hand, learning how to make a drum supposes coming to realize that each 
of the elements that intervene in this process are related in a common unity that is 
indivisible in practice. The soil that engendered the tree, the tree itself, its wood, the cow 
skin that covers the drum, the technical ability employed in composing these together, all 
these elements are an extension of, or a continuation of the hand of the young woman who 
is learning how to make a drum. Put differently, poiesis is a relational process that sustains 
all its inherent elements while transforming them all in the process itself. In the making of 
the drum all of its necessary elements become the making of the drum. 
On the other hand, making a drum supposes learning how the relationship between 
maker and instrument is in fact mutually creative. In this particular example, the student is 
dedicated to finding and choosing the qualities of her own sound, that is, of her drum’s 
heart. As her hand learns how to sculpt the wood and she begins to tell the different sounds 
that resound within it, she progressively becomes the drum maker; as the empty trunk 
begins to take the shape of a Ugandan drum it starts to reveal its proper sound and becomes 
a personal drum. Put differently, poiesis is a creative expansion of the human interaction 
with the world. In the making of the drum, maker and instrument become a mirroring echo 
of each other. 
Thus, we could argue that in the everyday practice of art education poiesis supposes 
an urgent need, a demand to be with the work from its preliminary material genesis, 
alongside its development, until the moment that it eventually leaves its makers’ hand. This 
is to say that poiesis requires from both teachers and students the capacity to respond with –
rather than to– the work, to be ready to inquiry about this very process of making that 




Let us further develop this example. Consider how the poiesis process that the drum 
maker is carrying on helps illuminate and challenge some of the teachers’ assumptions of 
what it is that knowing and making a drum looks like within their disciplines: 
The fact was that one afternoon, as the ensemble of eight grade musicians was 
rehearsing with their instruments, the school speakers announced that there was an 
unusually strong storm on its way and that classes were suspended to allow everyone a safe 
trip home. 
When the school reopened its doors the next morning after the tempest, our young 
drum maker realized with disgust that something had happened to her drum. “Someone did 
something to my drum!” she said infuriated to both the music and physics teacher. After 
looking at the drum –that seemed perfectly all right– the teachers asked “How so? What is 
wrong with it?” “Well, it sounds different this morning, thicker and deeper; yesterday the 
sound was lighter!” (p. 7). That was an excellent opportunity for both teachers to 
demonstrate their expertise. 
The music teacher explained that all instruments respond to changes in air 
temperature and humidity. That is why professional musicians take time to tune their 
instruments not only before the actual performance but also during its different movements. 
Likewise, the physics teacher emphasized how temperature variations affect the speed at 
which particles vibrate, and how water vapor actually affects the thickness or density of 
materials by attaching more or less particles to those bodies. The shared conclusion was 
“The storm changed the drum’s sound.” 
Faced with this type of information, our drum maker replied “I just want to know 




said this, she went to the back of the room and started experimenting with the strings that 
stretched the cow skin lids checking whether that would help recuperate the drum’s former 
sound (p. 13). 
Later that day I met with both teachers and tried to wonder about the implications 
behind what that student was looking for and what they had managed to do –or failed to 
do– through that dialogue about the drum. What became particularly interesting for us was 
that the change in the sound quality proved to be a real disruptive factor for the type of 
assumptions each of them had about their disciplines’ scope. Individually, each teacher was 
very sure that she had provided the student with an adequate explanation and had shown the 
reasons behind the sound change. However, when confronted with her colleague’s side of 
the explanation both teachers acknowledged that they were forced to considering what else 
was in music beyond pitches and rhythms, and what else was in sound beyond bouncing 
waves. The fact that the drum’s sound had changed had made them revisit their own ways 
of approaching both music and physics: 
For instance, the music teacher explained how intriguing she found the question of 
how exactly her instruments produced sound. It was evident for her that she had the 
necessary knowledge and technical ability to play different instruments with adequate 
mastery. And yet, her involvement with this experiment of making an instrument from 
scratch and learning how to play it proved to be a real trigger for an enlarged sense of 
musical inquiry. She finally argued “physics, once a distant discipline became suddenly a 
very interesting one” (p.7). 
Likewise, the physics teacher acknowledged “the limits of [her] capacity to explain 




she knew, for example, how to use a sonogram to show the physical impact that vibrations 
produce when bouncing or running through different materials. And yet, her involvement 
with the drum maker’s anxiety to try to recuperate her instrument’s original sound opened a 
window into considering what else is there in sound beyond particles vibrating across 
materials. 
As a conclusion to their reflection they both agreed that “with the instruments the 
students created, [we] were able to bring the elements of science and music into life” 
(p.11).
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 This claim still resounds with me. It makes me question if this is not actually 
another confirmation of how the notion of poiesis may impact art education by challenging 
teachers to make art and wonder about art next to their students. 
Let us recapitulate how the teachers’ task looked like in the beginning of this 
project: they were asked to develop the curriculum and all activities in collaboration, they 
had to be present at the other’s class, and they had to watch over the instruments’ 
fabrication and performance processes. Doing these things already provided them with an 
enhanced view on their own fields. For example, the music teachers affirmed “with the 
construction of these simple traditional African instruments students realized what happens 
when sound is produced, they can see and touch” (p.6). Likewise, the physics teachers 
claimed “the actual making of the instrument gave a wider scope to their creativity and 
provided a platform for individual and authentic work and deeper understanding of the 
concepts in physics” (p. 6). However interesting, what both teachers were talking about at 
that time was that students had “realized what happens,” students found a “wider scope to 
their creativity,” students got a “deeper understanding.” Students. And teachers?! 
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It was not until both teachers felt personally addressed by the challenge of that drum 
that had changed its sound that they were actually capable to assume the making of those 
instruments as something that resounded with and within them. Put differently, as teachers 
did not have the demand to make their own instrument I think they delayed –and could 
have completely missed out– an enriched inquiry about the relational and mutually creative 
qualities that emerge when viewing art through the lens of poiesis. 
Would I suggest, based on poiesis that teachers need to involve themselves in the 
making of the same artworks that they ask students to make? I do. Now, by proposing this 
someone could rightly question whether this implies that students and teachers are actually 
doing the same, that is, going through the same processes or engaging in the same activities 
that will produce the same works. I believe that our discussion of a primordial sense of art 





A primordial sense of art 
Let us recapitulate the example we provided in Chapter Two regarding the 
prehistoric artists that painted the walls of Lascaux –the ones Picasso judged as having 
“invented everything” (Thurman, 2008)–. These are the people that seemingly out of 
nowhere were able to produce some of the earliest signs of human civilization: prehistoric 
paintings of the lives of people, animals and plants. Unique about these paintings is the fact 
that their makers lacked any previous artistic knowledge except for the actual exercise of 
engaging with the materials they found around them, and wondering about their cave. 
Now, let us image our eight graders entering a similar cave-like situation where the 
only indication is to make a musical instrument. It is a similar situation in the sense that 
they have no memories of learning “music” and/or “physics” nor they know the rules or 
ways of using their specific methods. They are in the “dark.” The few things they find at 
hand are pieces of wood and cows skin; hammers and nails; sounds from the Ugandan 
jungle and sounds from their working desks. 
From the point of view of an observer outside their cave, what children start doing 
looks like playful naïveté. They are not afraid of making mistakes for there is no criterion to 
tell right from wrong except for the sounds that they are beginning to explore and learning 
to play with their instruments. They feel no demand to demonstrate that they know what an 
eight grader should know about music and physics for all they know throughout this 
experiment is linked to making those instruments. They find hard to understand questions 
about the use or benefit of this activity because for them this activity means making 
something of their own that will manifest their personal imprint in the world. The purpose 




So they gather around these new makings and experiment with their sounds. 
Sometimes there are irruptions of sparks that illuminate some while removing others into 
deeper shadows, for example, when students where informed at the beginning of the project 
that “the piano’s central pitch A could be translated as 440 hertz” (p. 13). At times there are 
outbursts of insight like, for example, when a student commented that the human voice was 
able to make different sounds including traditional musical instruments’ as she sung in tune 
with her native harp (p.11). 
By the end of the project all students perform together with their instruments before 
an audience of parents and fellow schoolmates. Between the different sections of the 
performance some students take time to explain how it was that they came to build their 
instruments. Fascinating about this scene is that, as students comment and reflect on their 
experience, they show the areas of the drum where “deeper” sounds come from; they 
demonstrate how the “vibration” of one chord affects another one; they make a point on the 
relationship between “sound” and “silence.” 
I believe this example helps manifest how meaningful a primordial sense of art can 
be for students. By this I mean that students’ knowledge of how the physical characteristics 
of the sound wave relate to the development and interpretation of music was –and, one 
could hope will be–inevitably linked to the fabrication of those drums and other African 
instruments. Put differently, for those students, the technical skills and disciplinary 
knowledge of music and physics are intertwined with the process of making and playing 





42, I would say in the students’ eyes, the elements of music and physics were always 
alive in the making and playing of their instruments. 
Still, this does not answer whether what students were going through was the same 
or similar to what their teachers were experimenting. It seems to me that teachers had to 
walk another path in comparison to students’, somewhat resembling a two-way movement 
of re-examination and transformation. 
To begin with, the sound-changing drum had forced them to take a step towards a 
primordial consideration of art as we commented above. This is to say that they had to learn 
to re-examine their own presuppositions about the actual scope and possibilities of their 
fields in view of the fact that there was a richer and more challenging reality to perceive 
beyond their original standpoints. There was more music beyond technical knowledge and 
performance; there was more physics beyond sonogram explanations about particles’ 
trajectories. Put differently, teachers had to unwind the seemingly one-way path of 
methodological conditions and arguments to engage in the heuristically naked making of an 
artwork. 
This movement certainly implied an effort, as if they were covering their eyes away 
from distinctions into the vision of an original unity. By now I believe we have produced 
the necessary language to suggest that those teachers were able to un-walk their partial 
perspectives and appreciate an original common ground where making and knowing shake 
hands. The effort of carrying this movement on lies precisely on the fact that they needed to 
re-examine what was altogether too familiar, too close, and so obvious that it had become 
invisible. For highly trained people like teachers –deeply involved in their disciplines’ 
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 “With the instruments the students created, [we] were able to bring the elements of 




ways– recuperating a primordial sense of art can be blinding like opening our eyes before 
the Sun with the intention to see ourselves. This is why in the example above teachers 
needed to meet the making of that drum as a way of recuperating their own handy 
knowledge of reality. 
However, this movement was not one that ended in mere concealment but allowed 
for a transformation. The point of arriving at a primordial perspective is not to reject or 
destroy the worth of disciplinary lenses. Instead, it is to carry on from their very basis a 
more acute awareness of the common reality that their individual views try to capture. 
Although this is the not the place to analyze the degree of reality of ‘inter or trans 
disciplinary’ knowledge, I do believe that a primordial take on art could help us imagine 
what else is there to be seen beyond stagnant limits that only emphasize, for example, that 
what you know in music is different from what you know in physics. Consider, for 
example, the following question that one of the teachers was able to formulate and ask 
students as they got closer to the end of “The sound of music” project: 
What does it mean for you to try to convey different musical qualities 
through your instrument now that you are beginning to understand the 
physical implications of sound in music? (p.13) 
 
 
This is not just a music and physic based question. This is an interpretative question 
whose formulation is not a disciplinary problem and whose answer is not a definitive 
solution. It is rather an invitation to go on wondering about what those instruments are able 
to produce. Certainly, it is a request to continue engaging with and within music and 





Making your own One 
We will now move on into considering our second example. I will present it as a 
way to illustrate and explore the theme of respiration and mimesis, that we introduced in 
Chapter Three and Four respectively, within the context of a lived artistic experience. We 
will pay special attention to the way these notions help open up room where to develop new 
interpretations of the work, and how these interpretations suppose the development of 
human-based resemblances with the work. 
In 2005 I taught a course on Contemporary Culture and Art to a class of twenty high 
school students in Buenos Aires’ suburbs. At that time, in the same school a colleague of 
mine was instructing an Art History course. By the end of the year her course had reached 
to Jackson Pollock while mine was developing a final comparison between Ancient and 
Modern-day art education. 
One morning during break-time I was getting ready for my class when the Art 
History teacher entered the staff room visibly upset. I asked her what had happened. After a 
tense pause she slowly unfolded a large image of Pollock’s One (see below) saying 
“They’re so wrong! They think Pollock is just rubbish!” The fact was my colleague had 
introduced Pollock’s One to the class, inviting the students to inquiry on the material 
conditions of the work, and invest some time wondering around it. According to her, the 
attempt had been a blunt failure filled by students’ mockery and laughter. To make things 
worse, she felt particularly hurt by a student who had reacted to the painting saying 





After such a description of her classroom experience we simply spent some time in 
silence, staring at One. Honestly, when one engages with this painting for the first time it is 
easy to understand the position from where some of my colleague’s students were 
criticizing it. At first hand, what you see is a chaotic combination of lines, colors, drops of 
paint, and different depths and textures, all assembled on a huge canvas (8’ 10’’ x 17’ 6’ in 
the original). This perception is reinforced if you go through the experience of listening to 
MoMA’s visual description of the work (MoMA, 2012). Even if you close your eyes, you 
will be imagining how One is an “abstract work without any hint of representation:” Black, 
blue, grey, brown and white paint, poured or dripped on the canvas forming straight lines, 
arches and waves that randomly overlay in traces of varying thickness: A web of infinite 
trails running across the limits of a frameless painting. 
However, on a second or third meeting with the work –as I was going through at 
that time– one may begin to unveil different viewpoints from where to approach it. It could 
be the case that the painting still looks very much chaotic but chaos is a relative notion –
like obscurity– that depends on lacking the necessary coordinates or criteria to make sense 




moment and in judging it chaotic I lose the opportunity to eventually see some meaningful 
quality of that hypothetical order? 
Also, it could be the case that one decides to challenge the claim that this painting 
has “no hint of representation.” If we literally understand representation as “an artistic 
likeness” (Agnes, 2002), there is nothing that prevents us from arguing that, for example, 
One is indeed a representation of the alternative kind of order we mentioned above or of the 
idea of transformation. I will get back to this point when restating mimesis. 
Finally, it could be the case that no matter how many times we meet this work, we 
could not help but seeing it as one big mistake, an error on canvas that offends the very 
notion of art, and that only deserves room in a decent galleria if presented as an example of 
what artists should never try to do unless they feel inclined to lose their job and pursue 
public humiliation. In this case, it would be fascinating to listen to the arguments that judge 
One as an invalid art form. 
After discussing similar interpretations with my colleague it became evident that 
there was much more to this painting than what an unfortunate first encounter could yield. 
And then it came to us: What if we took the claim that this type of painting is something 
anyone could do really seriously? In other words, more than trying to prove a student right 
or wrong, what if we asked all students to actually make their own One, using Pollock’s 
same materials and techniques? At that moment we could not anticipate if the experiment 
would work but we did agree that its purpose was not to try to technically reproduce 
Pollock but rather to get a sense of his approach to the canvas that would in turn allow 






And so we decided to work together and join our two courses in this end-of-the-year 
project. In view of the scarce amount of time we had available before the end of classes we 
paired up our classroom time and were able to secure two full hours on Wednesday’s 
afternoon. Thus, for four consecutive Wednesdays we devoted ourselves to “making your 
own One.” In the school gym –that was typically used as a mini-soccer stadium– we 
provided each student with a canvas of a smaller size (4ft x 8ft) than Pollock’s but 
respecting his canvas’ proportion.43 We also got different types of enamel and oil paints 
like those we can see in the painting, brushes and the necessary cleaning tools. Then we 
asked our students to place their canvases wherever they wanted on the gym’s floor and 
hanged a real size reproduction of One on the wall, making sure everyone could see it under 
adequate lighting. 
It is significant to stress that our sole indication during the project’s four weeks was 
that we were “making your own One.” We did think about watching all together Ed. Harris’ 
movie about Pollock’s life but time and chance decided otherwise. There was no 
complementary art or Abstract Expressionist scholarship involved either. Also, no one in 
the school except for the students and the two teachers was allowed to see the project until 
the premiere night. 
 
Respiration 
How did this project actually look like in the making? In a retrospective analysis I 
think its development echoes the conclusions we arrived at in Chapter Three when 
discussing some of the characteristics behind the notion of respiration. 
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Let us consider how this type of exercise supposes an opening up of room to be with 
the artwork. On a first level, this sense of space was stimulated by the fact that students 
were allowed to bridge the traditional distance between work, materials and themselves in a 
new way. On the first place, they were not only able to walk around the canvas but also to 
jump –and run through– into it. It was quite a view to see how students managed to 
discover some of Pollock’s own painting strategies and create new ones. The fact of placing 
such a large canvas on the floor without a wood frame or stand demanded a non 
conventional approach to it. Thus, some students brought scaffolds to reach where their 
arms could not, some others wrapped specific areas of the canvas unfolding others, a few 
even cut the canvas into more manageable pieces and later re-assembled their painting a 
piacere. 
On the second place, they were not only able to paint the canvas but to let the paint 
rain the canvas, erupt the canvas, and blow the canvas. It was exciting to see how students 
dared to explore alternative ways of making the paint reach their blank target. Some 
brought a fan blower to spread the paint like a color storm, others filled balloons with paint 
and later launched their bombs over their plain terrain, a few of them poured paint on one 
of the edges of the canvas and waved the paint towards its center by flapping its corners. 
On a deeper level, opening up room to be with the artwork meant that “making your 
own One” invited students to move beyond the trajectory that concludes the work of art in 
an explanation. Evidently, all art education activity implies some type of focus or lens –like 
the ones we provided, indeed, when we picked Pollock and gave our students those 
particular materials; and when we titled the whole activity “making your own One”–. Still, 




to stretch themselves out in the process of making the work. Put differently, we tried to 
frame the experiment as frameless as possible to try to avoid the risk of turning the work’s 
explanation into its main purpose; and those hypothetical collections of explanations into 
the objective of the entire class work. 
In other words, this experiment wanted to prevent an excess in the contextualization 
of art. If we understand context as “the parts of a discourse that surround a word or passage 
and can throw light on its meaning” (Agnes, 2002), this activity wanted to emphasize that 
the very process of making art is competent enough to illuminate what the work is about. 
This is not to purposefully distort or obscure its meaning but to acknowledge that without 
those elements that go together with the text –such is the literal meaning of the Latin prefix 
con in con-textus (Lewis, 2002)– we are surely left with a more naked setting from where to 
understand our work, but also with more room where to expand its meaning. 
Not to appear over exaggerated, I want to make clear that I believe there are brilliant 
explanations of One
44
 that can inform interesting interpretations of Pollock’s work 
individually and as a trend within contemporary art. For example, Ernst Gombrich (1998) 
affirms: 
The tangling of [One’s] lines satisfies two contrasting demands of twentieth 
century art: first, the yearning for the simplicity and spontaneity of 
childhood that evokes the memories of blurbs of a developmental age 
anterior even to the formation of images; and on the opposed extreme, the 
sophisticated interest for the problems of pure painting (p.602). 
 
 
It seems to me that in the case of our students, who were being introduced to 
Pollock for the first time ever, Gombrich’s remarks would have been too bright. I say this 
in the sense that from our students’ point of view, who had those white canvases before 
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them, considering such scholarly deep claims could have constrained their drive to 
experiment allá Pollock more than helped release that same drive. 
This is meaningful about respiration with reference to the decisions teachers need to 
take in art education. It is not just that in emphasizing the “breath” of an artwork we are 
able to go beyond the dichotomy between the “the yearning for simplicity and spontaneity” 
and “the sophisticated interest” for pure painting. In emphasizing the “breath” of art we are 
able to assume both extremes and dwell in their in-betweeness. It is in this “breath” that we 
will be able to develop interpretations that come together after relating and sustaining both 
the similar and the contrary, the illogical and the commonsensical. From the viewpoint of 
respiration, the work of art operates as a fact of these extremes coming together. 
However, by now someone could raise a real objection arguing that teachers will 
feel afraid –or think it is irresponsible– to suggest such a frameless experiment because it 
will inevitably render contradictory and paradoxical interpretations about the purpose of the 
experiment as a whole, and about the students’ work as the living elements of that whole. 
It seems to me that the peculiar gift that respiration has to offer to art education does 
involve a collection of colliding interpretations coming together. But this is not to say 
“anything goes.” Instead it is to grant the conditions that would allow for “everything can 
become from of this.” It is an expansive movement rather than a careless one. Put 
differently, respiration does not mean to enthrone the senseless, the speechless or the 
unfathomable but to allow for its interaction with our students’ and our own work. 
The question still remains as regards how to hold this “breath,” how to make sense 
of the type of meanings that may emerge from respiration. I think that the idea of mimesis is 




facts of art history. Instead, we are collaborating in the story of their own artworks, the One 
that they are trying to make possible. 
 
Mimesis 
Let us imagine the opening night of this school-wide exhibit of student work. People 
enter the school and walk towards the gym. When they get to the gate they can already 
begin to see how the ceiling lights are on, showing forty students standing next to some sort 
of carpets. As they walk into the room they realize that those carpets are actually paintings 
–if you can call those collections of scattered lines and paint drops, paintings–, and that 
there is a large exemplar of these peculiar art forms hanging on one of the walls as if it was 
a real piece of art being exhibited in a museum. On top of this picture, everyone can read a 
banner saying “Making your own One.” 
And so the administrators begin to walk around the student work, and parents feel 
moved to question their children about what is it that they have done. Also, some of my 
fellow teachers ask for the educational purpose of this activity where students have invested 
four Wednesday’s afternoon –I will not over-romanticize people’s comments although time 
may have helped me not to remember the less friendly remarks my colleague and I received 
that night– 
What I do recall is that the biggest surprise was caused by the variety of renditions 
of the “making your own One” guideline. The truth is that a large number of students had 
decided to make paintings that offered similar versions to Pollock’s. These were 
individually distinct and yet it was rather easy to tell the connection to Pollock’s theme. 
However, various students understood the guideline less literally and presented self-




numbers “1,” and a few created a comic-like narration of rock band U2’s song ONE. As the 
Principal put it with a hard-to-decipher-tone “They are all alternatives to the banner 
hanging on the wall!” Kindly understood I think that was precisely the case and a way of 
seeing how mimesis can impact art education. 
Let us restate what we said in Chapter Four: Aristotle conceives mimesis as the 
instinct from which poiesis comes forth. This, in the sense that before engaging with the 
material conditions and techniques that will help develop the work, the artist seems to have 
a natural sense that her work will focus on human life as its broad theme. In addition, 
Aristotle seems to argue that mimesis’ theme will manifest through the development of 
likenesses between artist and work. 
Thus, the notion of mimesis is crucial to help us understand that what students were 
trying to do in the Pollock experiment was not to reproduce a copy or to imitate Pollock’s 
work; instead, they were looking for their own personal approach to the canvas. It is 
significant here to restate what we said about the relationship between mimesis and 
imitation: Those realities that we can judge as imitated objects “cannot exist prior to the 
occurrence of mimesis” (Tsuji, 2010). While imitation aims at reproducing a likeness, 
mimesis focuses on opening up connections between human life and the work of art, and it 
is precisely out of these connections that likenesses will eventually emerge later on. 
As Walter Benjamin helped us see in Chapter Four, the gift that mimesis has to offer 
art is precisely granting the conditions that will allow developing likenesses between the 
work and those engaged with it (Benjamin, 1996). It is in this sense that mimesis is not only 
chronologically anterior to imitation but a philosophical precondition for the making of all 




imitate nothing but to attempt to create connections between their canvas, the experiment, 
and themselves. They were invited to produce human relatable works that connected One 
with the motto “making your own One.” 
And let us face the same type of objection we raised in Chapter Four: Even if we 
accept that mimesis’ theme is human life, and that it depends on granting the conditions that 
will allow developing resemblances between the artist and her work, where can we see that 
One or that our students’ works were portraying human life?! After all, the label “abstract 
expressionism” is very much attached to Pollock’s work and it seems to refer to an art form 
that was ejected outside of the world of humanity, and is now completely disengaged from 
it. 
Imagine we accept this critique and place ourselves before the messy, figureless 
blurb of One. Once again, what is human in there? I would say two distinct qualities: First, 
the print of a human artist’s hand. It is the work of someone who decided to venture her 
vital energies into the material continuation of her own self. This means that from the 
viewpoint of mimesis, artworks are human centered and connected because they are being 
made by human beings. By ‘being made by human beings’ I mean that the maker’s 
handprint is virtually present in the work even when it touches it no more. 
Second, regardless if we see in the work something that looks explicitly human, 
mimesis’ theme seems to point towards a qualitative disposition more than towards an 
objective comparison between particular works and a human map key. In other words, 
mimesis seems to call us to partake in bringing forth some type of meaning with the work, 




artworks need to provide for some type of relatable venue that could be assumed as human 
life. 
From this point of view, the question regarding what is human in One is no longer 
valid. We could replace it instead for how could we assume One as human life? And it is 
precisely in beginning to answer this question that we will see likenesses emerge before us. 
Let us take the example of those students that offered similar renditions to Pollock’s 
One. Imagine a parent entering that gym and walking between those canvases: Oh my! 
What are children doing in this school?! Complex, dense blurbs! Yet, in confronting and 
comparing a group of them she finds that each has something like a style, a strategic 
approach to the canvas. Some prefer twisted lines, some chromatic explosions, some 
raindrops, some all these together. The subject matter of these paintings can be actually 
decomposed in formal structures. How interesting! 
As she continues walking, her assessment of the work gives way to a wondering 
inquiry. Suddenly, she is no longer walking about, comparing students work, but 
journeying among them. She begins to see a more nuanced quality of complexity here. Let 
us say it has a name, a personal name, it is someone in her life story; someone whose 
presence in her life originally resembled a single thread of color. But in time became too 
convoluted, obscuring that former simple manner. Yet this new complexity still holds a 
peculiar integrity that gives room to further develop their relationship. There is still hope. 
Is this resemblance of life’s journeying real? Objective? Does it exist beyond that 
parent and those works? Restating what we said in Chapter Four, what is significant from 




By ‘possible’ I mean here that the artwork is not a fixed account of the past. It is not 
‘something’ that ‘someone’ began and finished in a remote era and is now the object of a 
fossils’ catalogue. From the point of view of mimesis, the artwork sustains the relationship 
between likenesses and allow for their ongoing development. Put differently, the likenesses 
that come forth in engaging with the work do not have to stop growing, ever. In revisiting 
the work, likenesses may re-emerge or be further transformed as I myself change 
throughout my life. From the viewpoint of mimesis, the artwork is an opening of 
possibilities. 
That likenesses are possible also means that at the same time that students 
developed those possible ways of “making your own One” they created a standard of how 
art –particularly painting in this case– can look like. We knew before starting the 
experiment that students had judged Pollock’s art as “rubbish” and One as something 
“anyone could do.” I cannot affirm that today they would argue something different but I 
believe that after going through those four weeks of experimentation they now possess their 
own rendition of what a white canvas can look like. This is a criterion that they lacked 
before the activity and now have at hand. It is a new lens, dynamic as their lives move on 
and they meet new art forms that complement their assessment of Pollock’s and their own 
canvases. It is a standard of possibility they were able to create for themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter we revisited the notions of poiesis, primordial sense of 
art, respiration and mimesis within the context of two lived art in education experiences. It 
is my hope that each of these ideas and their peculiar interactions became a lens to help us 




In the first example, The sound of music, we focused on poiesis and a primordial 
sense of art. As regards poiesis we showed how this notion help us see the making of an 
artwork as: a relational process that sustains all its inherent elements while transforming 
them all in the process itself –in the making of that drum all of its necessary elements 
became the making of the drum–, and a creative expansion of the human interaction with 
the world –in the making of the drum, maker and instrument became a mirroring echo of 
each other.– In addition, we saw how poiesis requires from both teachers and students the 
capacity to respond with –rather than to– the work. This means to be ready to inquiry about 
this very process of making that engulfs them both, and feel personally addressed by it. 
Moving on, in order to characterize how poiesis challenged students and teachers in 
a different way, we switched lenses to a primordial sense of art. From the students’ 
viewpoint we emphasized how the elements of music and physics were always alive in the 
making and playing of their instruments. This is to say that for them, the knowledge of how 
the physical characteristics of the sound wave relate to the development and interpretation 
of music is inevitably linked to the fabrication of those drums and other African 
instruments. 
From the teachers’ point of view, we showed how they had to go through a double 
movement. On the one hand, the sound-changing drum had forced them to re-examine their 
own presuppositions about actual the scope of their fields in view of the fact that there was 
a richer and more challenging reality to perceive beyond their original standpoints –there 
was more music beyond technical knowledge and performance; there was more physics 




seemingly one-way path of methodological conditions and arguments to engage in the 
heuristically naked making of an artwork. 
On the other hand, recuperating such a handy knowledge of reality allowed for a 
transformation. This is to say that they were able to carry on from the very basis of their 
disciplines a more acute awareness of the common ground that their individual views try to 
capture. The purpose of this transformation was not to reject or destroy the worth of 
disciplinary lenses but to anticipate the richness of stepping into new common arenas. 
In the second example, Making your our One, we focused on respiration and 
mimesis. As regards respiration we saw how this idea helps us bridge the distance between 
work, materials and artists in two ways. First, by allowing both teachers and students to 
experiment with non conventional ways of materializing their work. Second, by opening up 
room to be with the artwork beyond trying to explain it. This was not aimed at distorting its 
meaning but appreciating how less contextual environments may provide more naked or 
deprived grounds from where to understand our work, this is, more room where to expand 
its meaning. 
We emphasized how from the viewpoint of respiration teachers can help students 
perceive the “breath” between extreme perspectives on art education, and search for their 
work’s proper meaning within that in-betweeness. We argued that it is this “breath” that 
allows developing interpretations that come together after relating and sustaining those 
extreme perspectives. From the viewpoint of respiration, the work of art operates as a fact 
of these extremes coming together. 
In order to deepen our sight of how meaning may emerge from a perspective like 




focusing on human life as its broad theme and manifesting this theme through the 
development of likenesses between the artist and work. As regards conceiving the work as 
human-based we emphasized how art is always human in the sense that its processes and 
products are developed by human beings. And, even if we do not find anything that looks 
explicitly human in the work, mimesis incarnates a qualitative disposition, a call to partake 
in bringing forth some type of meaning with the work, assuming that meaning as an echo of 
our own life. 
This disposition to assume the work as an echo of our own life is what grants the 
opportunity to go on engaging with it, always open to seeing new possible resemblances as 
they emerge. In this sense, the work will create new possibilities as we revisit it, and will 
become a standard to perceive humanity as a whole under a new light, the light provided by 
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